Mapping the World: Justin, Tatian,Lucian, and the Second Sophistic. by Nasrallah, Laura Salah
 
Mapping the World: Justin, Tatian,Lucian, and the Second
Sophistic.
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly
available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story
matters.
Citation Nasrallah,Laura.2005.Mapping the World: Justin,Tatian,
Lucian, and the Second Sophistic. Harvard Theological
Review 98.3:283-314.
Published Version doi:10.1017/S0017816005000982
Accessed February 19, 2015 11:52:16 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10528296
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's
DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and
conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth
at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAAHTR 98:3 (2005) 283–314
Mapping the World: Justin, Tatian,
Lucian, and the Second Sophistic
Laura Nasrallah
Harvard Divinity School
In the late 1960s, African American children in Boston were asked to draw maps of
their neighborhood, near the old Mission Hillhousingproject. Thehousingproject,
largely white at the time, took up a large part of their hand-drawn maps, but was 
figuredi n various ways as a big blank: a no-man’s land, a topography absent of
marks or monuments.1 The streets aroundi t, as well as schools, restaurants, and
stores, were often carefully and clearly articulated, but the housing project itself
was an open, unmarked rectangle. Recent critical geographers have been interested 
in the way “people’s spatial behaviour is shaped by the hills and valleys of the 
invisible information and environmental stress surfaces over them.”2 Landscape
and the built environment of the city are not neutral, but have their own rhetoric,
exertingi nfluence on the bodies of those who move through them. Andh umans
map andinterpret space, understanding anddefining thelimits of theirknown world
through the movements of their bodies.
The idea that humans produce concrete place out of abstract space is not new,3
nor is the concept of the perils of a city or of configuring fear as a topographical 
1See Peter Gould and Rodney White, Mental Maps (2d ed.; Boston: Allen and Unwin,
1986) 14–17.
2Gould and White, Mental Maps, 108. See also their mention of perceived areas of safety and
danger in cities, “invisible stress surfaces” which lie over cities and influence people’s movements. 
For a more recent discussion of an approach to archaeology which “allows us to think about the 
ways in which landscapes and built forms were experienced, perceived, and represented by ancient 
subjects, workingf rom the starting point of a contemporaryb ody in the same space,” see Ruth M.
Van Dyke and Susan E. Alcock, “Archaeologies of Memory: An Introduction,” in Archaeologies
of Memory (ed. eaedem; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2003) 5–6.
3On space and place, see especially David Harvey, “From Space to Place and Back Again,” in
his Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996) 291–326.
See the cautionary words ofHenri Lef ebvre on uses of  the term “space” in his The Production of284 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
blank. Subjects of the Roman Empire also talked about urban decay, speculated
on the limits of the oikoumen  g , or inhabited world, andk new the danger of
not knowing where one was.4 The idea that ignorance about geography can lead
to danger is well demonstrated in a section from Strabo’s first-century Geogra-
phy, which seeks to persuade the reader of the utility of geography for states and
commanders, among others. He writes, “The barbarians carried on a topomachia
[etymologically speaking, a battle of place]5 in swamps, in pathless forests, and
in deserts, and they made the ignorant Romans believe to be far away what was
really near at hand, andk ept them in ignorance of the roads and of the facilities
for procuring provisions.”6 According to Strabo, geography serves the needs of
empire (preventing topomachia, for instance) at the same time that the spread of
empire leads to more empirical knowledge of geography—and, presumably, to the
pushingback of barbarian boundaries.7Knowledge, space, and imperial power are
Space (trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith; Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) esp. 1–27. Also influential to
my thinking about geography has been the work of another scholar influencedb yMarxism, as 
are Harvey and Lefebvre: Edward Soja, Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).
4There has been a surge ofi nterest in geography and space in the Roman world. See especially
Claude Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early Roman Empire (Ann Arbor, Mich.:
University of Michigan Press, 1991), originallyp u blishedi n 1988 as L’inventaire du monde.
Géographie et politique aux origines de l’Empire romain. A quick sampling of other recent works
includes: Colin Adams and Ray Laurence, Travel and Geography in the Roman Empire (New York:
Routledge, 2001); Space in the Roman World: Its Perception and Presentation (ed. Richard Talbert
and Kai Brodersen; Antike Kultur und Geschichte 5; Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004); James S. Romm,
The Edges of the Earth in Ancient Thought: Geography, Exploration, and Fiction (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1992); Katherine Clarke, Between Geography and History: Hellenistic
Constructions of the Roman World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). See also aspects of  d
Susan Alcock, Graecia Capta: The Landscapes of Roman Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1993). For other scholars of New Testament and Early Christianity who have recently
used geography and mental mapping as a framework for analysis, see, e.g., Loveday Alexander,
“Mapping Early Christianity: Acts and the Shape of Early Church History” in Interpretation 57
(2003) 163–75; eadem, “ ‘In Journeyings Often’: Voyaging in the Acts of the Apostles and in Greek
Romance,” in Luke’s Literary Achievement (ed. C. M. Tuckett; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic t
Press, 1995) 17–39; Judith Perkins, “Social Geography in the Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles,” in
Ancient Narrative Supplementum 1: Space in the Ancient Novel (2002) 118–31. James M. Scott’s
Geography in Early Judaism and Christianity: The Book of Jubilees (SNTS Monograph Series 113;
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) focuses on the reception of the table of nations
from Jubilees 8–9.
5Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (revised and augmented by
Henry Stuart Jones; Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), s.v. topomacevw: “wage war by seeking or holding
strong positions.”
6Strabo, Geographica 1.1.17; The Geography of Strabo, trans. Horace L. Jones after J. R. S. 
Sterrett; (8 vols. LCL; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960–1970) 1.37; see also 
Strabo, Geogr. 16.4.22.
7Geogr. 2.1. Among Alexander the Great’s workers were two road measurers who recorded
distances between stopping places and described geography, soil, flora, and fauna (O. A. W. Dilke,
Greekand Roman Maps [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985] 29; see also book 15
of Strabo’s Geography).LAURA NASRALLAH 285
imbricated. Strabo tries to sell his audience on the importance of geography and of
his Geography in particular by pointing to the dangers ofi gnorance and the power 
of knowing one’s place in the oikoumen .8
Writings in the Roman period that are labeled as geographies, like Strabo’s, may
contain some or all of the following discussions: ethnographic writing; lists of cities’
longitudes and latitudes; descriptions of topography; land itineraries and merchants’
accounts of voyages; speculations on the relationship between the mapping of the heav-
ens, especially the zodiac, and the terrestrial regions governedb y those heavens. Yet 
these same components are foundnot onlyin geographies. What I term “geographical
thinking” thrivedin a variety oftexts andgenres—like that of thefirst-century merchant
traveling the Erythrean Sea, or thefantastic voyages ofGreeknovels9—in thefirst and
secondc e nturies C.E.10 Those who used this kind of thinking often offered complex
pictures of the world, foldingissues of ethnicity,paideiaor culture, language and dialect,
politics and power into descriptions, or ekphraseis, of locations.
One aspect of geographical thinking is the evaluation of the relative locations 
and importance of cities, and the tracingof routes both real and imaginary between 
them.11 From the new conditions of the Roman Empire emerge complex mappings
8On itineraries andf ear in ancient Greekl i terature, see also François Hartog, Memories of Od-
ysseus: Frontier Tales from Ancient Greece (trans. Janet Lloyd; Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2001) 88: “Designed as it was to produce an inventory, a periplous held the void (blank 
spaces) in horror.” On Strabo’s particular attitude toward geography, see p. 92, where Hartog argues
that Strabo, unlike Herodotus, “confines the geographer solely to an investigation of the ‘inhabited
world’, to wit the space dominatedb y Rome.” Regarding Strabo, see also Dilke, Greek and Roman 
Maps, 62–64; and especially Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics, 8, who argues: “It is not a 
coincidence that the most complete geographic workh andedd own from antiquity, that of Strabo,
is from the Augustan period.”
9Geographypervades manyother discourses in the Roman world. For an example of the difficulty
of definingg eography, see among others Clarke, Between Geography and History. The range of 
sources that Nicolet treats in his Space, Geography, and Politics is a helpful reminder of the many
aspects of thought in the Roman world that touch upon geography. It is worth noting that Greco-
Roman novels tend to omit Rome entirely in their depictions of the world. Simon Swain explains
this “world without Rome” in terms of a deliberate Greek blindness to the present and an assertion
of Greek urban values apart from Rome; see his Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and
Power in the Greek World AD 50–250 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996) ch. 4; quotation from p. 109. For 
the most fantastic of these travel novels, see Lucian’s True Story. For a merchant’s itinerary, see 
Lionel Casson, The Periplus Maris Erythraei. Text with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
10Here I agree with Nicolet’s broad definition and exploration of geography in the early Roman 
empire: “This geography (representation through discourse, description, an account of a voyage,
or an itinerary andg eometric conceptualization) also comes with a cartography, or rather, it is
cartography. In antiquity the same words specify discourse and drawings”( Space, Geography, and
Politics, 4). For more on maps and cartography andf or a survey of geographicall i terature from the
classical to the Roman period, see Dilke, Greek and Roman Maps.
11Claudius Ptolemy’s Geography is basically an expanded list of significant cities, originally
intended merely as a handbook for helping with the use of his astronomical treatise, the Almagest;
it then expanded to a work in its own right.286 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
like that of Vitruvius, who addresses his De architectura to Augustus. Vitruvius
centers the map on Italy and the Roman people:
The populations of Italy partake in equal measure of the qualities of both
north and south, both with regard to their physiques and to the vigor of their
minds, to produce the greatest strength. . . . Thus the divine intelligence
established the state of the Roman People as an outstanding and balanced
region—so that it could take command over the earthly orb.12
Yet first- and second-centuryg eographical thinking about the Roman world is not
stable—it shifts even within this one text. In the same passage, Vitruvius celebrates
the man who is shipwrecked, the universal traveler: “An educated person is the
only one who is never a stranger in a foreign land, nor at a loss for friends even
when bereft ofh ousehold andi ntimates. Rather, he is a citizen in every country.”13
Vitruvius’s text oscillates between two poles: in one, the mapof the world centers on
Rome; in the other, the map of the world has no center but is traced bythe universal
traveler, citizen of everywhere, paideia in hand. Mappings such as Vitruvius’s and
Strabo’s are products of andi mplements for politics.
This article focuses on three second-century figures, Justin, his student Tatian,
and Lucian, who are educated travelers like the shipwreck victim that Vitruvius
describes. I investigate how they map their world, andi n particular how paideia,
or Greek culture and education, and the conditions of the Roman Empire inflect
their geographical thinking. By using the term “geographical thinking” to talk about
the works of Justin, Tatian, and Lucian, I do not refer to “authentic” psychological
states, but rather to how these authors constructed their world in the context of the
Roman Empire and the culture wars of the so-called second sophistic. The second
century was perhaps a peaki n the production and exhibition of an elite, antiquar-
12Vitruvius,Architectura6.1.11 (Ten Books on Architecture[trans. Ingrid D. Rowland; commentary
and illustrations by Thomas Noble Howe; New York: Cambridge University Press,1999] 77). For
Vitruvius, architecture, geography, cosmography, and ethnicity are all part of the same complex of 
problems; see also Arch. 6.1.12. Arguments like Vitruvius’s (or like those of others in the Roman
period) presage Herder’s and others’ debates over Volk and land in the eighteenth and nineteenth k
centuries. On Herder, autochthony, and hybridity, see Robert Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in
Theory, Culture and Race (New York: Routledge, 1995) 36–43. For more on climate/region and
ethnic identity, see, e.g., Hartog, Memories of Odysseus, 138–39. Nicolet (Space, Geography, and
Politics, 194) mentions this passage and its engagement with “the imperial destiny of Rome.” He
misses, however, the tension between this passage and the one I discuss next.
13Arch. 3 6.preface.2 (trans. Rowland, 75). Citizenship and displacement are discussed often in
literature of the first and second centuries; one example is Paul’s statement in Phil 3:20: “But
our commonwealth is in heaven” (RSV; hJmw`n ga;r to; polivteuma ejn oujranoi`~ uJpavrcei). For an
analysis of exile and elite male identityi n the second sophistic, see Tim Whitmarsh, “ ‘Greece is
the World’: Exile and Identityi n the Second Sophistic,” in Being Greek under Rome: Cultural
Identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire (ed. Simon Goldhill; Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001) 269–305. On the traveler in Greek and Roman literature, see
Hartog, Memories of Odysseus.LAURA NASRALLAH 287
ian Greeki d entity14 that was (variously) an act of resistance towards the Roman 
Empire and an item of social capital to be acquiredby provincial andRoman elites
alike.15From this context of the second sophistic emerged mental maps of the world, 
sometimes centered on an invented Greece, an imagined Athens, a real Rome, or 
an idealized barbarian land.
The term “second sophistic” is borrowed from the third-century C.E. writer
Philostratus’s characterization of those who had more recently imitated the soph-
ists of classical-period Greece.16Among those who participatedi n and resisted the
second sophistic, “Greek” marked not only a region, ethnicity, or language, but
also a set of practices whichi ncluded antiquarian impulses, an emphasis on the
importance of Plato and Homer, the use of the Attic dialect, and the manipulations
of genres associated with classical Greece, such as dialogue. The second sophistic 
was not a club to be joined, but rather an educational and political trend in which 
Justin, Tatian, and Lucian participated, which spawned satire and debate over 
culture or education (paideia ( ( ), cultic practices, and ethnic identity under Rome.17
Instead of understanding Justin as central to Christian apology (and Tatian as 
disturbingly and angrily at its margins), as scholars often do, I readb oth authors,
and Lucian too, as traveling points on a broader map. Not only do all three talk
about their travels; their rhetorical constructions of these travels also function to 
authorize their arguments, to guarantee their experience, and most importantly to 
signal something about their relationship to the fluidity of Greek identity and the 
seemingsolidityof Greek paideiain the Roman world.18Theliteratureofthesecond
14On the construction of Greeki d entityi n antiquity, see especially Jonathan Hall’s Hellenicity:
Between Ethnicity and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). Although Hall’s book
treats an earlier period, his concluding chapter mentions the way in which the second sophistic’s 
interest in defining Hellenic identity in terms of culture borrows from certain definitions of Hell nes
in the classical period (e.g., pp. 225–26).
15See Maud Gleason’s neat formulation: “Paideia, for both Greek and Roman gentlemen, was a 
form of symbolic capital” (Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome [Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995] xxi). Interest in (elite) male bodies and their representation 
in antiquity is widespread in scholarship today. Much of this work is excellent and has inspired and 
challenged my own readings, yet I want to signal the potential problems and politics of this turn, in
which I admittedly participate in this article. Why are scholars today so interestedi n the construction
of ancient masculinity, and especially in ancient males who are represented as melancholic in their
exile, struggling to negotiate their way under the conditions of empire, benefiting from that empire
and resisting it at the same time, elite but vulnerable? We may be interested in them because we 
conflate our understanding of their situation with perceptions of our own contexts of elite educa-
tions, participation in current academic struggles over “great books” and canon, the itinerancy of
academia, feelings of hybridity. One danger is that studies of masculinity can draw from feminist 
research on gender, yet avoid the ethical turn that many feminists insist upon.
16See Swain, Hellenism and Empire,1 –7.
17See Timothy Horner, Listening to Trypho: Justin Martyr’s Dialogue Reconsidered (Leuven: d
Peeters, 2001) esp. 72–83, where Horner observes that Justin should be read within the context of
the second sophistic.
18In the context of a discussion of Parmenides and Lucian, Tim Whitmarsh writes: “Rather than
confining him to his native land, Paideia offers him access to the whole world; and, in particular, 
access to the centre, Rome. Education offers a relocation from the parochial to the universal, from 288 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
sophistic, including geographical texts, turned to Odysseus as a model; exile and
wandering built up cultural credentials, whether you are Paul as depictedb y Luke,
Apollonius as depicted by Philostratus, or Lucian meditating upon the fatherland.
Yet these constructions and self-constructions of traveling teachers emerge from a
context of sometimes violent struggles over provincial and metropolitan identities
under colonial conditions, and of elite production and manipulation of cultural
identities and sources of authoritative knowledge. Postcolonial critics’ interest in
the hybrid identities of subject elites keeps our eyes open to something analogous
in antiquity, something we see in Justin, Tatian, and Lucian: the negotiation of
authoritative culture under conditions of empire, and simultaneous resistance and
assimilation to this paideia.19
In what follows I have three intertwined goals. First, I seek to complicate the
model of center and periphery that has often been used to talk about the Roman
Empire or about Greeks and barbarians in the ancient world. Justin, Tatian, and
Lucian do not merely contrast Rome and their marginal, eastern homeland. Their 
geographical thinking is far more complex: they are Vitruvian men, traveling
between cities and accruing the authority that such cosmopolitanism lends; they
weighanddebate the metropolitan claims of citieslike Athens or Jerusalem or even
Lucian’s homelandi n Syria, whichh e calls Hierapolis, the “holy city.” Second,
in placing Justin and Tatian alongside Lucian, I remap the traditional scholarly
approach that frames Justin and Tatian in terms of Christian apologetic and the
boundaries of Christianity and Hellenism, and show instead that these authors
engage in the broader debates of the second sophistic. Third, scholars have at-
tended to issues of geography and space in the writings of Greeks and Romans.
But insufficient attention has been paid to the same topic among Christians in the
Roman Empire,despite thefact that Christianityhaslongbeendepictedas thriving
because of cities and travels between them,20 andd espite the fact that Christians
livedi n a world where discussions of geography were widely prevalent. Thus, I
take up and nuance this theme of cities, travel, and geography. I turn now to ex-
plore how Lucian, Tatian, and Justin construct maps of the empire and their own
places within it, paying special attention to their characterizations of cities and
the particular to the general” (Greek Literature and the Roman Empire: The Politics of Imitation
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001] 124). Of course, this image could be used of Justin and
Tatian as well. On the idea of fluidity, see the work of Denise Kimber Buell, who argues that early
Christians partook in the racializing discourse of Greco-Roman antiquity, in part by rhetorically
deploying the idea of the fluidity andfi xity of race or ethnicity: “Race and Universalism in Early
Christianity,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 10.4 (2002) esp. 436–38; and Why This New Race?
Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 
19See Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994). On state control of
space and resistance to that control, see, e.g., Lefebvre, Production of Space, 23.
20To offer only one example, see Wayne Meeks, The First Urban Christians: The Social World
of the Apostle Paul (2d ed.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). LAURA NASRALLAH 289
especially of real and epistemic violence—that is, violence toward certain kinds
ofk nowledge—in Rome.
 Justin, Tatian, and Lucian
From their places within the influence of the second sophistic, Justin, Tatian, and 
Lucian offer similar self-constructions. They are philosophers (or at least truth-
seekers) from the eastern ranges of the empire, struggling with what it means to 
be a rhetor, sophist, and/or philosopher in their common cultural context. Like
Vitruvius’s shipwrecked traveller, their paideia renders them universal travelers
of sorts, but they tweak and question both this paideia and their imagined and real
travelsbetween cities. Justin not onlyfamously constructs himselfas a philosopher, 
but also does not challenge the appellation of sophist when it is applied to him.21
Tatian describes himself as “having played the sophist”;22 hea lso criticizes those
who are attracted to the glossomania of the philosophers rather than a “serious 
quest for the truth.”23 Lucian, of course, has multiple texts in which he toys with 
the roles of rhetor and philosopher, most famously A Double Accusation.
All three also present their philosophical quests by drawing upon a narrative
common to the time: that of the truth-seeker who wanders through the philosophi-
cal marketplace,24 seeing the shortcomings of various teachers: their greed, their
deception, their folly. Justin presents himself as having progressed through Stoic,
Peripatetic, Pythagorean, and finally Platonist philosophy, but he only became a 
21Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone 3.3. Filovlogo~ ou\n ti~ ei\ suv, e[fh, filergo;~ de; oujdamw`~ oujde; 
filalhvqh~, ouj de; peiraÊ` praktiko;~ ei\nai ma`llon h] sofisthv~; “Therefore are you some philologist,
he said, who is not at all industrious or a truth-lover, nor does he attempt to be a practical man,
but rather a sophist?” The edition is that of Miroslav Marcovich, Iustini Martyris Dialogus cum 
Tryphone (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1997). 
22Tatian, To the Greeks (Oratio ad Graecos), 35.1. Unless otherwise noted, all translations
of Tatian are from Whittaker (Tatian: Oratio ad Graecos and Fragments [ed. and trans. Molly
Whittaker; Oxford: Clarendon, 1982]). When I offer my own translations, these have been helped
by hers. I use the Greek edition of Miroslav Marcovich, Tatiani Oratio ad Graecos (Berlin: W.
de Gruyter, 1995).
23Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos, 3.3 (Whittaker, 9).
24For reference to several such texts, and a discussion of the marketplace of mystery cults in
antiquity, see Arthur Darby Nock, Conversion: The Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the
Great to Augustine of Hippo (repr. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998) 107–22. 
On this as topos of the day, see Erwin Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr (Jena: Verlag  r
Frommann, 1923) 59–62, and especially Tessa Rajak, “Talking at Trypho: Christian Apologetic as 
Anti-Judaism in Justin’sDialogue with Trypho the Jew,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, 
Jews, and Christians (ed. Mark Edwards et al.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 64–66.
25Dial. 8.1–2. For another promenade of philosophers, albeit in a different style, see Tatian’s 
list in Oratio ad Graecos 2. After his introductory blow—“What that is distinguishedh ave you 
producedb y your philosophizing?”—he mocks the faults of Diogenes, Aristippus, Plato, Aristotle,
Heraclitus, Zeno, and others, sometimes humorously, as in his account of Heraclitus’s dying from
having smeared himself with a poultice of feces.
26Oratio ad Graecos 29.1. In Paul too we find discussion of Greek and barbarian, in particular the
idea of obligation “both to Greeks and barbarians, both to the wise and to the foolish” (Rom 1:14).290 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
philosopher as his spirit was set on fire with an “affection for the prophets, and
for those who are friends of Christ.”25 Tatian, too, asserts that he “participatedi n
mysteries and tested cults” and rejected them in favor of “barbarian writings.”26
From reading Lucian, we would think that everyone in the second century was
running around in philosophical drag, claiming serious interest in philosophy, but
really in love with money and fame.27 All guarantee the rightness of the truth to
which they have come by ekphraseis, or “descriptions,” which remind the reader 
of the authenticity of their travels and the certitude of what theylearned, especially
through seeing.28
All three also critique what we would call religion:
If anyone sacrifices, [the gods] all have a feast, opening their mouths for the
smoke andd rinking the blood that is spilt at the altars, just like flies. . . . Then
too they [humans] erect temples, in order that the gods may not be houseless
and hearthless, of course; and they fashion images in their [human] likeness.
. . . Those who offer victims . . . deck the animal with  garlands . . . ; then
they bring it to the altar and slaughter it under the god’s eyes, while it bel-
lows plaintively—making, we must suppose, auspicious sounds, andfl uting
low music to accompany the sacrifice! Who would not suppose that the gods
like to see all this? And although the notice says that no one is to be allowed
within the holy-water who has not clean hands, the priest himself stands there
all bloody, just like the Cyclops of old, cutting up the victim, removing the
entrails, plucking out the heart, pouring the blood about the altar, andd oing
everything possible in the way of piety.29
Reading this without attribution, one might guess that it was written by Tatian or 
some other Christian satiristbitter about other religious practices, suchas Minucius
Felix.30 But it comes from the pen of Lucian, whose mockery of claims to piety
extended to various Mediterranean rituals and cults, including the perpetually
insulted Egyptian and (then, much later) Christian cults. If we were to read Justin
27See also his True Story (Vera historia), which mocks the travelogue and admits to being full
of lies, even as it claims also to be spurred by the desire for travel in order to quest for knowledge:
“Once upon a time, setting out from the Pillars of Hercules andh eadingf or the western ocean with
a fair wind, I went voyaging. The motive and purpose of my journey lay in my intellectual activity
[hJ th`~ dianoiva~ periergiva] andd esire for adventure, andi n my wish to find out what the end of the
ocean was, and who the people were that lived at its end” (Vera historia 1.5; Lucian: Works [trans.
Harmon, LCL, 1.253], with small modifications). Note that the phrase here translated “intellectual
activity” has a sharp undertone of futility and needless excess of learning. Unless otherwise noted,
all translations of Lucian are from the Loeb edition.
28On the connection between travel and theoria, or seeing, see Hartog, Memories of Odysseus,
90–91. Hartog also discusses the way in which Maximus of Tyre depicts Anacharsis’s tour of Greece
not as a moment ofg ainingk nowledge from Greece, but rather of testingi ts wisdom (p. 112).
29Lucian, De sacrificiis 9–13 (trans. Harmon, LCL, 3.165–169).  For a critique of religious
chicanery of the style of Lucian’s Alexander the False Prophet, see Tatian’s mockery of Heraclitus
and Empedocles (Oratio ad Graecos 2.1; 3.2).
30See, for example, Justin, 1 Apol. 4–5.
31Rebecca Lyman’s “The Politics ofPassing: Justin Martyr’s Conversion as a Problem of‘Hel-
lenization’ ” (in Conversion in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages: Seeing and Believing [ed.LAURA NASRALLAH 291
and Tatian merely as (Christian) apologists, we would miss this larger context of
debate over Greek education, Greco-Roman myths, and the panoply ofcult practices 
around the Mediterranean.31
I have called Justin, Tatian, and Lucian Vitruvian men because their rhetorical 
constructions of their lives echo Vitruvius’s account of the shipwrecked traveler 
who needs only paideia to fit into foreign country or household. But in using
this term I intend, too, to conjure up Leonardo da Vinci’s famous drawing of the 
perfectly balanced man, inscribed within a circle, and the source that the drawing
interprets—Vitruvius’s comments about the ideal symmetry of the human body
and the analogy of this body to architectural measure.32 Severald i sciplines—from
religion to critical geographical theory to feminist theory—open our eyes to the
way in which space is understood and geographical understanding is developed 
from our particular bodies. Jonathan Z. Smith, discussingg eography, puts it well: 
“It is the relationship to the human body, and our experience of it, that orients 
us in space, that confers meaning to place. Human beings are not placed, they
bring place into being. . . . Place is best understood as a locus of meaning.”33 We
shape our maps and orient ourselves through our bodies, and Justin’s, Tatian’s, 
and Lucian’s very specific bodies are represented as tracing the geography of the
empire in various ways.34
Thinking with andb eyond Vitruvius, we can see that the human body is a site
from which an understanding of space emerges, but that it is also a measure for 
Kenneth Mills and Anthony Grafton; Studies in Comparative History; Rochester, N.Y.: University
of Rochester Press, 2003] 36–60) also points to the limitations of the category of apologetic, which 
might distract us from Justin’s broader cultural context (esp. 43–44). Those in antiquity, whether
Christian or not, who debate education, myth, and cult often aim their critiques at non-elite cult
practices and are part of a broader trendi n “pagan monotheism.” See the introduction to Pagan
Monotheism in Late Antiquity (ed. Polymnia Athanassiadi and Michael Frede; Oxford: Clarendon, 
1999) 1–20, esp. 8–9.
32SeeArch.3.1, esp. sect. 9. Vitruvius also understands human bodies and columns to be analogous, 
and genders his columns (Doric are male; Ionic and Corinthian are female); see Arch. 4.1.6–8.
33Jonathan Z. Smith, To Take Place: Toward a Theory in Ritual (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1987) 27–28; this emerges in a discussion of Kant. For an extremely succinct overview of
the concept of space in the history of philosophy, see Lefebvre, Production of Space, 1–2; this is
followedb y a strenuous critique of postmodern uses of the term “space.” Smithh as elsewhere
reminded us of the importance of geography and space to the study of religion. In his “What a Dif-
ference a Difference Makes” (‘To See Ourselves as Others See Us’: Christians, Jews, ‘Others’ in 
Late Antiquity [ed. Jacob Neusner and Ernest S. Frerichs; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1985] 3–48), 
Smith discusses the power of Greco-Roman understandings of geography even over Christopher 
Columbus. Regarding religion, ritual, and geography, see also David Frankfurter, “Introduction: 
Approaches to Coptic Pilgrimage,” in Pilgrimage and Holy Space in Late Antique Egypt (ed. idem; t
Leiden: Brill, 1998) esp. 13–18. 
34This concept of the body’s movement through space has also been developedb y theorists such
as Soja and Lefebvre, mentioned earlier (see above, n. 3), as well as Smithi n To Take Place.S ee
also Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (trans. Steven Rendall; Berkeley: University
ofCalif ornia Press, 1984); and Heidi J. Nast and Steve Pile, “Introduction: MakingPlacesBodies,”
in Places through the Body (ed. eidem; New York: Routledge, 1998) esp. 1–6.292 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
defining the architectures, cities, and the spaces surrounding thebody. For example,
Vitruvius suggests that altars and gods be placed at various heights in relation
to the human body in order to create the proper effects for awe and worship.35
Humans are transformed by the rhetoric of given places and by their movements
through space.36 And as feminist scholars have stressed, the body is itself a space
open to use and penetration, subject to mapping, with borders that are discrete
yet penetrable. Justin, Tatian, and Lucian are elite males who are concerned both
with their approaches to cities, gods, and altars, and withh ow the borders of their
bodies and minds are pressed upon by Greek paideia and the Roman Empire to
which they are subject.37 Recent scholarly analysis ofh ybridity and ambiguity,
of assimilation and negotiation under the conditions of empire, helps us to read
Justin’s, Tatian’s, and Lucian’s geographical thinking and their deployment of 
ethnic, cultic, and local categories as part of their colonial condition, part of the
structures of real and epistemic violence under Rome and its (re)production of a
Greek cultural hegemony.38
In the sections that follow, I shall read Justin and Tatian—the latter of whom,
I will argue, is not as lugubrious as has been thought—alongside Lucian, the
David Sedaris of the second century.39 All three are from the eastern parts of the
empire, toying withbarbarianidentity as wellas Greekness, mentally mapping the
oikoumen , simultaneouslyin terms ofits geography, its ethnicities, andits authorita-
35Arch 5 . 4.5–9.
36For more discussion, see, for example, Elizabeth Wilson, The Sphinx in the City: Urban
Life, the Control of Disorder, and Women (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); and
Dolores Hayden, The Power of Place: Urban Landscapes as Public History (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1995).
37On male bodies and concerns about integrity and penetrability, see, for example, Jennifer A.
Glancy, “Boasting of Beatings (2 Corinthians 11:23–25),” JBL 123 (2004) 99–135.
38Rebecca Lyman (“The Politics of Passing”) also offers an excellent discussion of Justin’s
relationship with philosophy under a colonial context and analyzes Justin in terms of hybridity
and postcolonial theory. See also her presidential address to the North American Patristic Society:
“Hellenism and Heresy: 2002 NAPS Presidential Address,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 11
(2003) 209–22.
39There are only a few briefli nkings of Tatian and Lucian in modern scholarship. See Kathy
L. Gaca, The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics, and Political Reform in Greek Philosophy and
Early Christianity (Berkeley: University ofCalif ornia, 2003) 224, n. 10; Peter Lampe,  From Paul
to Valentinus: Christians at Rome in the First Two Centuries (ed. Marshall D. Johnson; trans.
Michael Steinhauser; Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 2003) 289, n. 19; Molly Whittaker, “Tatian’s
Educational Background,” in Studia Patristica 13: Papers Presented to the Sixth International
Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 1971, Part II: Classica et Hellenica, Theologica,
Liturgica, Ascetica (ed. Elizabeth Livingstone; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1975) 57–59; and her
edition and translation: Tatian: Oratio ad Graecos and Fragments (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982); see
also J. L. Lightfoot, Lucian On the Syrian Goddess (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003)
203. Lyman, “The Politics of Passing,” 40, mentions Lucian’s parodies about paideia in the context
ofher discussion ofJustin.
40On ethnicity and race in antiquity, and especially on Christians’ manipulation of the rhetoric
of race’s fixity and fluidity, see Buell, Why This New Race? Buell’s work has influenced manyLAURA NASRALLAH 293
tivelocations ofknowledge.40 Theydraw on thelong tradition, studiedby scholars
like François Hartog and Arnoldo Momigliano, of Greek concerns about alien or 
barbarian wisdom and thus Greek anxiety about what constitutes Greek identity 
and knowledge.41Their works construct maps of the relative epistemic topography
of the Roman Empire, and the writers present themselves as authoritative bodies 
that, having toured the Roman Empire, can guarantee the truth of their evaluations 
by ekphrasis itself—by their “description” or, rather, constructions of authentic 
experiences of various sites ofk nowledge in important cities. They also present 
themselves as bodies subject to potentialdanger, whether realor epistemic. I begin
with Lucian in order to set Justin and Tatian within their broader cultural context,
andi n order to resist the urge to frame Justin and Tatian in terms of apologetic or 
intramural Christian debate.
Lucian
aspects of my thought on the rhetoricald eployment of ethnicity.
41Hartog, Memories of Odysseus; Arnoldo Momigliano, Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Helleniza-
tion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). In my approach I appreciate but differ from
Guy Stroumsa’s Barbarian Philosophy: The Religious Revolution of Early Christianity (WUNT 112;
Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1999); Stroumsa understands Christians as developing “some kind of eth-
nological curiosity, or interest in exotic peoples” (p. 58). I read figures like Justin and Tatian instead
as reworking barbarian identity from within.
42For background on Lucian, see Swain, Hellenism and Empire, 298–99. On the complexity and
hybridity of Lucian’s identity, see especially Whitmarsh, Greek Literature and the Roman Empire,
248–53; Ja  Elsner, “Describing Self in the language of Other: Pseudo (?) Lucian at the temple of 
Hierapolis,” in Being Greek Under Rome (ed. Goldhill) 123–53. Only recently has interest turned to
Lucian not as a figure whose bitter satire marks him as marginal, but as an intellectual player fully
involvedi n debating the themes ofhi s day. See Tim Whitmarsh, “Varia Lucianea,” The Classical
Review 53 (2003) 75.
43See Gleason, Making Men, and R. Bracht Branham, Unruly Eloquence: Lucian and the Comedy
of Traditions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989) 1–4 on oratorical performance in
the second sophistic. On defining Lucian as a sophist, see R. Bracht Branham, “Introducing a Sophist:
Lucian’s Prologues,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 115 (1985) 237. Chris-
topher Jones (Culture and Society in Lucian [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986]
12–14) argues that even if Lucian “converted” from sophistical oration to more philosophicald i alogue
(conversion is a problematic frameworkf or such analysis, in my view, and Jones himself calls the
situation “irrecoverable”), his work would have been performed orally. For a reading of Lucian using
postcolonial and feminist theory, see Rosa Cornford Parent, “Mapping Identity in the Lucianic Corpus”
(Ph.D. diss., Department of Classics, University of Southern California, 2000). Lucian discusses his
own career turn in The Dream (Somnium), also called Lucian’s Career (Vita Luciani), in which he
depicts Sculpture and Paideia (both personified) competing over him in a dream, and his choice to
attachh i mself to Paideia. In this workh e admits that it is Paideia that allows him to travel and to see
the map of the world from on high, literally: on Paideia’s chariot, “I was carried up into the heights
and went from the East to the very West, surveying cities and nations and peoples, sowing something
broadcast over the earth like Triptolemus” (Lucian, Vita Luciani 15 [trans. Harmon, LCL, 3.229]. The
barbarian Lucian claims that he cannot remember what he sowed, only the applause of those over
whose heads he flew, but with this image he signals that he carried something like Triptolemus’s plate
of corn, a sign for cultivation and civilization in Greek literature. On the fatherland, see Lucian, My294 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
Lucian, born between 115–125 C.E. in Samosata,42 constructs a Syrian character
who is a truth-teller at the center of many ofhi s dialogues. He himselfli terally and
literarily performs his Syrian identity as a rhetor, a master of Greek oratory and
Greek paideia performing and writing in the cities of the Mediterranean basin.43
As we shall see, Lucian is like Justin in his admiration of Greek philosophy and
rhetoric, and like Tatian in his impulse to use and satirize Greekness. Here I deal
only briefly with a few works from Lucian’s wide corpus, focusing on his discus-
sion anddepiction of three cities, and their relative epistemic values:hishome city
Hierapolis, Athens, and Rome.
Although elsewhere in his writings he appears as the character of the Syrian,
in On the Syrian Goddess, Lucian offers a more autobiographical tone: “I myself
that write am an Assyrian.”44Lucian maps his home city, Hierapolis, or “holy city,”
as the center of the sacred and holy.45 It is also the place that literally holds a part
of him, a lock of hair that he placed in the city’s main sanctuary, in obedience to
local tradition.46 The city not only holds a fragment of him, but also exhibits hy-
bridity and ambiguity on multiple levels, and thus, the writer suggests, mirrors or 
produces his own complex identity andl i terary impulses.47 Speaking of the city’s
central cult—located topographically on a hill in the middle of the city,48 Lucian
says that “many stories were told, of which some were sacred, some manifest,
some thoroughly mythological, and others were barbarian, of which some agreed
with the Greeks. I shall relate them all, but by no means accept them all.”49 Lucian
Native Land (Patriae encomium).
44De dea Syria 1 (trans. Lightfoot, 249). All translations are from Lightfoot’s translation and
edition of Lucian’s On the Syrian Goddess. Lucianic authorship of this piece has been questioned
because ofi ts Ionic dialect andi ts relatively uncritical presentation of a local cult. But Simon Swain
has convincingly argued that the piece is indeed Lucian’s, attributing the Greekd i alect to Lucian’s
consciousimitation ofHerodotus’s ethnographic work, and the positive tone to Lucian’s appreciation
of his Syrian heritage. See Swain, Hellenism and Empire, 304–7; and Jones, Culture and Society
in Lucian, 41. Lucian himself talks explicitly about a desire to imitate Herodotus—even if this is
in a very particular rhetorical situation of introducing a speech in Macedonia—in his Herodotus
or Aetion. Lightfoot, too, concludes that Lucian is the author, while also learnedly surveying the
history of scholarship on the question of authorship (“The Authorship of De Dea Syria Revisited,”
in On the Syrian Goddess, 184–208).
45“These are the ancient and great sanctuaries of Syria. But as many of them as there are, none
seems to me to be greater than those in the Holy City, nor any other temple holier, nor any country
more sacred” (De dea Syria 10 [trans. Lightfoot, 253]). Lucian’s ekphrasis ofthe ce ntral cult is such
that the city itself recedes except as a kind of platform for the temple and its festivals.
46De dea Syria 60.
47For a similar reading of De dea Syria, see Elsner, “Describing Self in the language of Other,”
123–53. This tendency toward hybridity and ambiguity is also true of Syria more broadly. Lucian’s
description of cults in Syria points to the sort ofhyb ridity of religions andi d entities that occurred
in the second-century Roman world, particularly in the Greek East: “There is another large temple
in Phoenicia, one that belongs to the Sidonians. As they themselves say, it is Astarte’s—I myself
think that Astarte is Selene—but as one of the priests told me, it belongs to Europa the sister of
Cadmus” (De dea Syria 4 [trans. Lightfoot, 249]).
48De dea Syria 28.
49De dea Syria 11 (trans. Lightfoot, 253).LAURA NASRALLAH 295
does not foreclose on competing stories or multiple scenarios of origins; indeed,
he includes four possible accounts of the temple’s foundation.50
This ambiguity and hybridity is woven into the very characters who are key 
to one of the holy city’s stories of origin, which includes a castrated man who 
helped in the building of the temple and whose statue stands there “in the shape 
of a woman but still in the clothing of a man.”51 Even the image of Hera in the 
sanctuary offers its own ambiguities, since it “appears to be of many forms” and 
“has something of Athena and Aphrodite and Selene and Rhea and Artemis and
Nemesis and the Fates” in her many attributes.52 Andi f  this were not enough to 
prove that Lucian constructs hishome city as a theme park ofhybridity, we can note 
that he mentions another statue that “has no shape ofi ts own, but bears the forms
of the other gods. It is called the standard (shmhvi>on) by the Assyrians themselves, 
who have not given it a name of its own, nor have they anything to say about its 
place of origin and form.”53
Elsewhere in his corpus, Lucian’s mappings are again particularly focused on 
cities and ethnicities, and even more particularly on the alchemies of their inter-
sections. Again, he is fascinated with the conjoining of things that are or seem 
different. He isinterestedinhow Syrians,for example, performin Athens, andhow
Greeki d entity performs in Rome. The former situation is played out in The Dead
Come to Life (Revivescentes sive Piscator).54 Here Parrh siad s, literally “off ree
speech,” is a stand-in character for the likes of Lucian. Questioned by the character 
Philosophy about his fatherland, Parrh siad s replies: “I am Syrian, Philosophy,
50De dea Syria 1–16.
51De dea Syria 26 (trans. Lightfoot, 265). Stratonike is ordered by Hera to build her a temple 
in the Holy City. Upon the order of Stratonike’s husband the king, she is accompaniedb y the
beautiful Combabos. Sensing what might happen on the trip, Combabos “unmannedh i mself,” yet 
Stratonike still fell in love with him; his severed testicles, resting back home in a small casket 
with myrrh, honey, and other spices, serve as proof to the king of the innocence of his relationship 
with Stratonike. The story offers an etiology for ongoing sexual ambiguity in the city. Lucian slyly
reports: “This sort of love exists in the Holy City and still endures today: women desire galli and 
galli go madf or women, but no one is jealous and theyb elieve the thing to be entirely sacred”
(22; trans. Lightfoot, 263).
52De dea Syria 32 (trans. Lightfoot, 269). The statue itself embodies many things not only in 
its ambiguous reference to Hera, but also in its materials, whichi nclude precious stones “sent by
Egyptians, Indians, Aethiopians, Medes, Armenians, and Babylonians” (32).
53De dea Syria 33 (trans. Lightfoot, 271). See also the unusual bearded Apollo (34–35).
54It is particularly interesting to look at Revivescentes sive Piscator, since it performs a situation 
so often associated with Christian apologetic: trial and defense. The theme is also evidenced in 
The Double Indictment (Bis accusatus), which is set in Athens, on the Areopagus. A rhetor, called 
only “the Syrian,” is called up to trialf or having offendedb oth Rhetoric and Dialogue. The real
offence, it seems, is the hybridizing of genres and the bringing ofh umor into dialogues. Regarding
genre-mixing in Lucian, see, e.g., Branham, “Introducing a Sophist,” 237–43.
55Lucian, Revivescentes sive Piscator 19 (trans. Harmon, LCL, 3.31).  r Revivescentes sive Pisca-
tor claims to respond to complaints about  r Philosophies for Sale (Vitarum auctio); in this earlier
writing, Lucian had depicted various philosophical lives as being up for sale; in Revivescentes sive
Piscator, the philosophers themselves seem to rise from the dead to protest Lucian’s cheap sale of296 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
from the banks of the Euphrates. But what of that? I know that some of my op-
ponents here are just as foreign-born as I. . . . Yet as far as you are concernedi t
would make no difference even if a man’s speech were foreign, if only his way of 
thinking were manifestly right and true.”55 On one level, the story tells of Lucian’s
own danger and discomfort, as all the old prestigious philosophers gather in Athens
to judge him—or Parrh siad s. The setting is the Athenian acropolis, where piety
(Parrh siad s prays to Athena Polias) and prosecution can coexist. Lucian performs
Greek paideia in part by conjuring up Greek philosophers of the past, including
Plato and Diogenes, and ventriloquizing their arguments; he does so also by the
form of The Dead Come to Life itself, whichd eftly mixes literary conventions of
this time. Through the Syrian Parrh siad s, Lucian argues that he in fact defends
philosophy against those who are merely costumed philosophers: “in beard, I mean,
and walk and garb”—an image to which Justin too conforms and which Justin
accuses others of using wrongly.56 Athens itself is depicted as a magnet for every
kind of philosophical fakery,57 for those who claim to be interested in philosophy
but instead are lured by wealth. Often, Lucian jokes that he is concerned with the
confusionbetween true andfalse philosophy. This confusion resultsfrom the many
who dress up withl ong beards and mantles to look like philosophers.
WhileThe DeadCome to Lifedepicts Athens simultaneously as thepolis oftrue
philosophy and offake philosophy, Nigrinus, set in Rome, offers a less ambivalent
picture of Athens. It begins by measuring in terms of true paideia thed istance on
the map between Rome and Athens. Lucian writes, “The talk began with praise
of Greece and of the people of Athens.” Athens is here praised not as a magnet
of false philosophy, but as the ultimate philosophical and pedagogical city: when
the nouveau riche enter, Athenians gently correct by mocking displays of wealth,
and “disciplining” with “public education.”58 Those who love wealth and power 
“should live in Rome,” states the philosophical Nigrinus, “for every street and
their philosophical approaches. Lucian also treats the theme of philosophy, the city of Athens, and
the foreigner in his discussion of Anacharsis in The Scythian (Scytha)—a work in which, according
to Hartog, Lucian himselfi s working out issues of paideia and patronage (Memories of Odysseus,
114). In Scytha 5, the city of Athens with all its seductive paideia-filled charms, and all of the glories
of Greece, are walled within one man, Solon; to have seen Solon is to have seen all Athens.
56Revivescentes sive Piscator 31 (trans. Harmon, LCL, 3.47). Although Lucian is interested in r
arguments about the difference between rhetoric and philosophy, and although he caricatures dif-
ferences in philosophical schools and figures, ultimately he sees all philosophy as capable of unity:
all who are not seeking for wealth and false claims to philosophy are truth-seekers. On wearing
philosophical gear without deserving the name of philosopher, see Justin, 1 Apol. 4. In the Dialogue
with Trypho Justin is recognized as a philosopher because of what he wears.
57See especially the account of the second part of the trial, where “philosophers” are luredf or
judgment by the promise of gifts.
58Lucian, Nigrinus (trans. Harmon, LCL, 1.113). For more on Rome and Lucian, see Whitmarsh,
Greek Literature and the Roman Empire, chap. 5, especially for a discussion of the complexity of 
Lucian’s construction ofRome inNigrinus and its pair, the Apology, in which Lucian somewhat
apologizes for his critique of the patronage system (291–93). Whitmarsh also discusses the difficul-
ties of reading Nigrinus because of its complicated literary frame (265–79).LAURA NASRALLAH 297
every square is full of the things they cherish most, and they can admit pleasure
by every gate—by the eyes, by the ears and nostrils, by the throat and genitals. Its 
everflowing, turbid stream widens every street . . . and sweeps the flooded soul 
bare of self-respect, virtue, and righteousness.”59 Lucian conflates the geography
of the city and the individual’s body so that urban and philosophical ills are one; 
literal and philosophical sewage streams through both city and person. The city
itself is a perfect testing ground for the philosopher, since it is so full of tempta-
tions, from food to races to philosophicall ecture-rooms that were mere “factories
andb azaars.”60
Rome is not only a center for dangers, temptations, and potential pollutions;
it is also the site of a kind of voluntary slavery for philosophers hawking Greek-
ness.61 This is something of which Tatian, too, accuses the Greeks—or those who 
claim Greek identity through paideia,62 although he does not locate the compro-
mised philosophers in Rome: “You established rhetoric on a basis of injustice and 
chicanery, sellingy our freedom of speech for pay.”63 While The Dead Come to 
Life mocks those who are costumed as philosophers, On Salaried Posts in Great 
Houses implies that Lucian is precisely that: a costumed philosopher for hire. On
Salaried Posts maps Rome as a site for ethnic hierarchy andh umiliation. The cli-
ent-philosopher seeking a patron is “subordinate to a doorman with a vile Syrian
accent”64—Lucian’s slyjoke points to his own vulnerability as a Syrian maskinghis
accent and marketing hispaideiain various venues. Not only is the Syrian doorman 
superior, but the patron’s unphilosophical friends complain about the new client, 
saying, “It is only these Greeks who have the freedom of the city of Rome. And 
yet, why is it that they are preferred to us? Isn’t it true that they think they confer 
a tremendous benefit by turning wretched phrases?”65 Lucian points to the ways 
in which the patron buys or “collects” the philosopher:
[A]s you have a long beard, present a distinguished appearance, are neatly
dressedi n a Greek mantle, and everybody knows you for a grammarian or
a rhetorician or a philosopher . . . it will make people think him a devoted
student of Greek learning and in general a person of taste in literary matters.
59Nigrinus (trans. Harmon, LCL, 1.117, slightly modified).
60Nigrinus (trans. Harmon, LCL, 1.125).
61Voluntary entry into a salaried post for a rich patron leads only to servitude: “Remember 
never again . . . to thinky ourselff ree or noble. All that—your pride of race, your freedom, your
ancient lineage—you will leave outside the threshold, let me tell you, when you go in after having
sold yourselfi nto such servitude” (Lucian, De mercede conductis 23 [On Salaried Posts; trans.
Harmon, LCL, 3.449]).
62On paideia allowing for a claim to Hellenic identity, see Hall, Hellenicity, 223–26.
63Oratio ad Graecos 1.3 (trans. Whittaker, 5).
64De mercede conductis 10 (trans. Harmon, LCL, 3.431).
65De mercede conductis 17 (trans. Harmon, LCL, 3.441).
66De mercede conductis 24 (trans. Harmon, LCL, 3.455).
67De mercede conductis 23 (trans. Harmon, LCL, 3.459). See also Whitmarsh, Greek Literature298 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
So the chances are, my worthy friend, that instead of your marvelous lectures
it is your beard and mantle that you have let for hire.66
Eventually, Lucian claims, the philosopher willbecome part ofa Roman-ownedcol-
lection, one among many performers for the rich Roman patron, juxtaposed perhaps
with “an Alexandrian dwarf who recites Ionics.”67 The bearded philosopher’s lent
identity and Attic dialect are visually and acoustically odd, a collectible tchotchke
of paideia for the wealthy, upwardly mobile Roman.
Some scholars understand the Roman Empire to have generously incorporated
and given voice to a figure like Lucian.68 While it is difficult to reconstruct fully
Lucian’s reception by the imperial elite, he at least hints that his rhetorical self-
formation occurs under imperial eyes. In the works we have investigated, Lucian
uses geographical thinking to consider the conditions of the Roman Empire, toying
with the claims of different cities to be the center of the world. When Rome is at
the center, it is shown to be a city mapped as analogous to a hungry and excreting
body, with gateways that welcome pleasures and roads that run with sewage. Indeed,
Rome is ravenous, collectingGreekness and other oddities, buyingphilosophywith
no understanding. When Athens is the center of Lucian’s map, it is shown to be a
haunt of those who claim to be true philosophers and rhetoricians, but are lacking;
even a Syrian can show them up. Rome and Athens also hold within them hybrid
possibilities,but this mixingis presentedashierarchical, abusive,dangerous. Only
when Lucian’s map centers on the holy city in Syria does his focus remain there.
Hierapolis is depicted as homeland, as holding a bit of Lucian, and as a center for 
every sort of hybridity and ambiguity.
and the Roman Empire, 280, on how this work maps power and the Roman house; Whitmarsh
also states with regard to another writing, Somnium: “[I]t is notable, however, that Paideia offers a
success premised entirely upon appearance [dovxa]: the attraction is that he will be ‘in good repute’
[eujdokimw`n] and ‘regarded’ [ajpoblepovmeno~]. The splendid clothing he will wear suggests con-
cealment and deceit” (123), but his conclusion that “paideia “ does not simply realize innate destiny:
it transforms the subject, crossing sociocultural barriers” (124) does not sufficiently account for
Lucian’s ambivalence and mockery of paideia elsewhere in his corpus.
68“It marks a certain degree of cultural self-confidence when a system such as the Roman empire
can not only incorporate ‘foreigners’ like the Gallic eunuch Favorinus or the Syrian ‘barbarian’
Lucian among its major Greek writers but can also give the ‘other’ a critical voice in commenting
on its own customs and attitudes” (Ja  Elsner and Joan-Pau Rubiés, “Introduction,” in Voyages and
Visions: Towards a Cultural History of Travel [ed. eidem; London: Reaktion, 1999] 10–11). While
I agree with Swain’s comment that “Lucian’s attitude towards Rome is complex,” I disagree with
his overall characterization of Lucian: e.g., “For most of the time Lucian’s adopted cultural identity
as a Hellene did not clash with his loyalties to Rome’s Empire. But in cases where Greek culture
was abused by Roman power, it is clear where he stood” (Greek Literature in the Roman Empire,
329). I think that Lucian is far more complex than this.
69Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 4.29. Later, Eusebius is more positive in his representation
of Tatian andl umps him with Justin, Miltiades, Clement, and others who speak of Christ as God
(5.28.4). Eusebius considers Tatian’s Oratio ad Graecos (and, incidentally, his Diatessaron) to be
useful and appropriate (4.29.7). 
70Jerome, In epistulam ad Titum, praef; cited in Whittaker, Tatian: Oratio adG raecos and
Fragments, 83. Epiphanius calls the Encratites “Tatian’s successors” (Pan. 47.1.1); translated inLAURA NASRALLAH 299
Tatian
Nobody likes Tatian. Eusebius, citing Irenaeus, says that Tatian introduced the 
“blasphemy” of Encratism.69 Jerome labels him the “patriarch of the Encratites”; 
Epiphanius concurs.70Even those who more recentlyhave worked intimatelyenough
with Tatian to edit his work offer judgments like this: “[T]he harshness and obscu-
rity ofhi s style seem to mirror his arrogant andi ntransigent personality.”71 He is
often characterized as Justin Martyr’s slightly crazed student:72 vicious andb rutal,
excessive in his rhetoric. Both are understood as early apologists for Christianity, 
who struggled with the question ofh ow to fit Christianity and Hellenism together. 
But Justin is depicted as offering a better kind of apologetic to the empire. He of-
fers the possibility of the assimilation of Christianity and Hellenism, or at least the 
articulation of Christianity as philosophically competent, a necessary negotiation
or syncretism for the sake of Christianity’s success. Tatian, with his vitriol against
Greekness, is seen as the failed path that Christianity did not pursue. 
This reading of Tatian does serious injustice to the passion andh umor of To
the Greeks. Tatian’s over-the-top critique of the Greeks is not the product of em-
barrassingly angry Christian apologetic, but draws upon satirical conventions of
the second sophistic.73 Like Lucian, his near-contemporary andf ellow Syrian,
Tatian performs Greekness—he has a full repertoire of philosophical and cultural 
references on hand—at the same time that he subverts the contemporary cultural 
valuation of Greekness and praises barbarian identity. Lucian wrote two differ-
ent pieces about Anacharsis, the Scythian who signaled so much about barbarian 
identity, barbarian wisdom, andbarbarianhungerfor Greek philosophy. Tatian, too, 
The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis (trans. Frank Williams; 2 vols.; New York: E. J. Brill,
1987–1994) 2.3. Tatian is famed and maligned for at least three things: first, for his Diatessaron,
ag ospel harmony; second, for being the founder of Encratism, which is understood as heresy; and 
third, for the bitterness of his late-second-century Oratio ad Graecos—the only of Tatian’s works 
to survive in its original form. L. W. Barnard (“The Heresy of Tatian—Once Again,” Journal of
Ecclesiastical History 19 [1968] 1–10) reads Tatian’s detractors uncritically and seeks to secure a 
timeline of the evolution of Tatian’s “heretical” thought—that is, his Encratism—and the writing of
his Oratio ad Graecos. Others read Tatian as taintedb y his “Oriental” background; for a critique
of this approach, see Lampe, From Paul to Valentinus, 290. On the dating of Oratio ad Graecos,
see G. W. Clarke, “The Date of the Oration of Tatian,” HTR 60 (1967) 123–26, who argues that it 
may not be as late as 177 C.E., as R. M. Grant has dated it.
71Whittaker, Tatian: Oratio ad Graecos and Fragments, xiv–xv. Elsewhere, Whittaker proves
herself slightly more a champion for Tatian: “Tatian is not an Oriental with an inferiority complex;
the differentiation is one of culture, not of race” (“Tatian’s Educational Background,” 59). For a 
newer champion of Tatian that takes him seriously in his context, see Emily J. Hunt, Christianity
in the Second Century: The Case of Tatian (New York: Routledge, 2003).
72On Tatian as Justin’s student, as an apologist, and as a heretic, see, e.g., Barnard, “The Heresy 
of Tatian—Once Again.”
73On Tatian’s education, see Lampe, From Paul to Valentinus, 285–90, where he argues that 
Tatian is less educated in philosophy than Justin, but more educated in classical literature and in
rhetoric. Lampe asserts that Tatian was influenced by the famous sophist Dio of Prusa (pp. 287–88). 300 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
shows knowledge of that tradition and throws it in the face of the “men of Greece”
(a[ndreı ”Ellhneı) whom he addresses. Like Lucian he makes himselfi nto a kind
of misunderstood Anacharsis: “You, who don’t curse the Scythian Anacharsis now,
also shouldn’t be indignant at being educated by those who follow a barbarian
code of laws.”74 Both Lucian and Tatian try on different topoi andb a rbarian roles
in their play with Greek paideia.
While the genre of Tatian’s work remains elusive,75 part of its purpose becomes
clear as one reads: it is a piece ofh umor, a satire, a joke of sorts. Because it is hard
tohear the sound of playin culturesdifferentfrom our own, Tatian’s wickedhumor
has gone unrecognized.76 But he does signal that what he said may or should be
taken as a joke. At a crucial moment in his argument, when Tatian has explained
his tour of Greek cult and his “conversion” to Christianity, he turns to his inscribed
audience and says, “To you, the Greeks, what else can I say but do not revile your
betters, nor, if they are called barbarians, take this as an occasion for a joke.”77 In
To the Greeks, vocabulary of jokes and laughter is used again and again; we know
from Lucian that irony, joking, and satire can reveal the core of a bitter truth. In
On Tatian as a sophist, see Whittaker, “Tatian’s Educational Background,” 57.
74Oratio ad Graecos 12.5 (my translation).
75MichaelMcGehee (“WhyT atian Never ‘Apologized’ to the Greeks,”Journal ofEarly Christian
Studies 1 [1993] 143–58) has argued that the Oratio is protreptikos, advertising to students Tatian’s
philosophical stance and rhetorical skills. Molly Whittaker, too, understood Oratio ad Graecos as
hortatory, but pointed to a different audience: “[H]is main concern is to urge pagan readers to leave
the error of their ways in order that they may turn to the truth” (Oratio, xv). Robert Grant argued
that Tatian’s oration takes the form of a “logos syntaktikos or ‘farewell discourse’ to the culture of
Greece and Rome”; but instead of offering praise, as one usually would, Tatian inverts praise into
yovgoı, “blame, censure” (“Five Apologists and Marcus Aurelius,” Vigiliae Christianae 42 [1988]
12). See, however, Annewies van den Hoek’s “Apologetic and Protreptic Discourse in Clement of
Alexandria” (in La littérature apologétique avant Nicée. Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique [ed. A.
Wlosok; Vandœuvres-Genève: Fondation Hardt, forthcoming]), where she points out that protreptic
is not a genre in antiquity. Part of the problem of identifying the genre of Tatian’s work (and thus
of understanding its tone) may be the tendency of writers of the second sophistic to mix genres,
as we saw with Lucian.
76Cicero,i n the The Making of an Orator ( r De oratore), states that “all . . . who tried to teach
anything like a theory or art of this matter [humor] proved themselves so conspicuously silly that
their very silliness is the only laughable thing about them. That is why I think this accomplishment
cannot possibly be imparted by teaching” (2.54.217–218; in Cicero [trans. Sutton and Rackham,
LCL, 3.359]). On humor, rhetoric, and Lucian, see also R. Bracht Branham, “Authorizing Humor:
Lucian’s Demonax and Cynic Rhetoric,” Semeia 64 (2001) 33–48. Within Oratio ad Graecos there
are many references to laughter and joking (e.g., 1.3, 2.3, 3.1, 17.1).
77Oratio ad Graecos 30.1–2 (my translation). On Tatian’s “conversion,” see Laura Nasrallah,
“The Rhetoric of Conversion and the Construction of Experience: The Case of Justin Martyr,” in
Studia Patristica 18: Papers Presented at the Fourteenth International Conference on Patristics
Studies held in Oxford, 2003 (ed. E. J. Yarnold and M. F. Wiles; Leuven: Peeters, forthcoming).
78Elsewhere, Tatian rhetorically turns as if to face an audience that does not understand which
parts ofhis speech are f unny and which are not. In a section on demons and disease, he states: “And
you, ifyou do not stop your laughter, will en joy the same punishment as the sorcerers. Therefore,
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Tatian’s work, the joke is on the Greeks, since he mocks their famed philosophers
and customs through quick, devastating character sketches and illustrations.78
With his biting critique of Greekness, Tatian maps his understanding of the 
Roman Empire, discussing not only his homeland and the travels he has made, 
but also constructing a topography of the relative values of knowledge in these 
regions, and of the peaks and valleys of epistemic violence. Tatian, moreover, 
directly engages geographical (and thus also what we would call astronomical) 
theories of the time, in a passage where he points to the superior knowledge of the
(barbarian) prophets:
For heaven . . . is not infinite, but bounded and within a limit; and above
this one are better worlds whichh ave no change of season . . . but experi-
ence a wholly good climate and have a permanent day and light inaccessible 
to people from here. Now those who worked out geographies described the
regions, as far as is humanly possible, but since they could not speak of the
ones beyond, because they could not see them, they claimed that there were
tides, and seas leek-green and muddy, and one area burning hot while another
was cold and frozen.79
The overlapbetween ethnicidentity, geographical thinking, andknowledgebe-
comes clear at important moments inhis text at thebeginning and end. Tatian ends
To the Greeks in this way: “All this, men of Greece, I have compiledf or you—I 
Tatian, a philosopher among the barbarians, born in the land of the Assyrians, and 
educated first in your learning and secondly in what I profess to preach.”80 The
first linesof Tatian’sTo the Greeksread: “Do not maintain a totallyhostile attitude 
toward barbarians, men of Greece, nor resent their teachings. For which of your
own practices did not have a barbarian origin?”81 He then launches into a full-
throttle performance ofhi s knowledge of the true genealogies of what the Greeks
claim as their own: the Phrygians Marsyas and Olympus taught themflute-playing,
Etruscans taught sculpture, Egyptians taught about history.82
With these pendants, we can see how Tatiandivesinto the contemporary culture
wars; he addressesHell nesand critiques them, putting them in their place as inferior 
to the so-called barbarian culture that, despite their sneers, the Greeks appropriate.
irrationality to the herald of truth” (Oratio ad Graecos 17.1 [trans. Whittaker, 35]).
79Oratio ad Graecos 20.2–3 (trans. Whittaker, 41). See Lampe, From Paul to Valentinus, 429,
for a list of geographers to whom Tatian alludes.
80Oratio ad Graecos 42.1 (trans. Whittaker, 77).
81Oratio ad Graecos 1.1 (my translation).
82Oratio ad Graecos 1.1–2.
83Strabo, too, admits that Greeklanguage appropriates others’ terms; see Geogr.14.2.28.See also
his intriguing comment (in a different context) about mixing in 14.5.25 (trans. Sterrett and Jones, 
LCL, 6.365): “And who are the ‘mixed’ tribes? For we would be unable to say that, as compared 
with the aforesaid places, others were either named or omittedb y him [Apollodorus] which we shall
assign to the ‘mixed’ tribes; neither can we call‘mixed’ any of these peoples themselves whomhehas
mentioned or omitted; for, even if they had become mixed, still the predominant element has made
them either Hellenes or barbarians; and I know nothing of a third tribe of people that is ‘mixed’.” 302 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
Thus, his opening statement ossifies the categories of Greek andb arbarian, but
then immediately questions those same categories. Taking up the long tradition of
discussing “barbarian” or foreign influences on Greek knowledge, Tatian argues
that on every level Greekness itself is a fiction, born of miscegenation: Greek lan-
guage appropriates words from other languages and dialects from other cultures.83
And by the end of his piece, Tatian marks his location and implies the travels he
has taken to get there: he is among barbarians (a term reclaimed as positive); he is
originally andfi nally Assyrian; he can guarantee that he has taken the educational
tour through Greece and Rome, yet found Greek culture and paideia wanting.
If scholars refer to Tatian at all, other than to point to the rabidity ofhi s prose
or to his purported role as founder of the Encratites, they often mention his “con-
version” and that he, like Justin, was attracted to Christianity through reading the
Scriptures. Tatian frames the end of his journey for truth in terms of the antiquity,
divinity, and simplicityof wordingof “barbarian writings.”84What scholars do not
generally observe is the carefully crafted autobiographical context of this conver-
sion, which plays upon two themes especially relevant to the second sophistic,
which we have seen already in Lucian: first, travel and education, or paideia, and
second, education andl anguage.
In this passage on Tatian’s apprehension of truth, Tatian’s introductory themes
of thefalse pretensions of Attic purity and the “arrogant andcrazy talk” of pseudo-
philosophers85 arise again and lead to a kind of climax: the story of Tatian’s own
philosophical choices. Tatian had begun his To the Greeks not with a critique of 
philosophy—mockingphilosophers comes second on his list—but with an incisive
cut at the impure genealogy of Greek language itself. It is made up of multiple dia-
lects: Dorians differ from Attic speakers, Aeolians from Ionians. What is even stranger 
than thisimpurity—literally most out of place, most no-place of all (ajtopwvtaton),is
that those who consider themselves Greeks have mixed with expressions that are
not “akin” (ta;ı mh; suggevneiı uJmw`n eJrmhneivaı)86; they are not genetically Greek,
so to speak. Later, in the crucial passage about his own “conversion,” Tatian re-
prises this theme. In a pattern that mimics but reverses his introduction, he attacks
philosophers first, and then turns to the related issue of language.87 He accuses his
inscribed audience of constructingitself byits relationship to words, and of engag-
This reference to a trivton gevno~ is especially intriguing given Christian uses of that appellation.
For a different direction in interpreting Geogr. 14.2, see Eran Almagor, “Strabo’s Barbarophonoi
(14.2.28 C 661–3): A Note,” Scripta Classica Israelica 19 (2000) 133–38.
84Oratio ad Graecos 29.1.
85Oratio ad Graecos 3.3, where we find a pun on philopsophos. While Justin, as we shall see,
applied the term to Crescens, Tatian here contrasts it explicitly with (true) philosophers.
86He precedes this by saying that he does not know “whom to call a Greek” in light of so many
regional variations in Greek( Oratio ad Graecos 1.3 [trans. Whittaker, 5]).
87Oratio ad Graecos 25–26. See sections 1–2 for the opposite ordering of argument. For Tatian,
philosophy and language are always linked.
88Tatian continues: “Why do you assert that wisdom is yours alone? . . . The grammarians have
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ing in verbali mperialism. “Stop your triumphal procession of another’s words,”
he insists. The word qriambeuvonteı conjures up a ritual parade of prisoners and
spoils of war—verbal pillaging. “Stop decorating yourselves with feathers that 
aren’t your own, as if you’re a jackdaw!” he says, using an image of linguistic
pretension that also appears in Lucian.88 He goes on to point specifically at current 
trends in Greek education89—and in particular, trends in rhetoric—as the root cause 
of tragic and comedic misunderstandings of the truth.90
As part ofhi s story of conversion, Tatian adopts another theme of the second
sophistic: that of the traveler or ethnographer.91 In the second century, Pausanias’s 
tour of Greece imitated Herodotus, celebrated classical culture, and constructed
Greeki d entity in the face of Roman imperialism, ignoring any recent changes to 
the landscape.92 Like Pausanias, but with a twist, Tatian offers a brief tour of the 
empire and its various customs. Greeks avoid intercourse with their mothers; Per-
misfortunes; you abuse beyond reason figures of speech. . . . Why do you get ready for a war of
letters? Why, like boxers, do you strike together their pronunciations through Athenian stammer-
ings, when it’s right to speak more naturally? For if you atticize but aren’t an Athenian, tell me
why you don’t ‘doricize’? Why does it seem to you that one [dialect] is more barbarian, while the
other is more satisfactory for communication?” (Oratio adG raecos 26.2–4; my translation). For 
second-sophistic play with dialect, see, e.g., De dea Syria, discussed above. 
89Oratio ad Graecos 27.1. See also his critique of the fact that some philosophers receive salaries 
from the Roman emperor (19).
90Tatian mocks Greek myths and superstitions and particularly critiques what we might call
“ancient pluralism.” In the context of thinking about apology, it is interesting to note that Tatian
employs the language of the courtroom to condemn the pluralism which undergirds “their” legisla-
tion: “Therefore I lay a verdict against your legislation. There should be a common constitution for
all. But now, there are as many legal positions as there are kinds of cities, and what is considered
shameful by some is considered good by others” (Oratio ad Graecos 28.1 [my translation]). For a 
different take on the theme of legal diversity in the Roman empire, see Athenagoras, Supp. 1, which 
indicates that the multiplicity of legal systems in the Roman empire marks Roman tolerance. 
91The theme of the traveler in Greek literature of course predates the second sophistic. See 
Hartog, Memories of Odysseus, which traces these traditions. But the second sophistic, withi ts
strong antiquarian interests, andi ts love of Homer, is particularly interestedi n picking up this an-
cient discursive thread. Its detractors, too,i mitate and satirize the theme of travel. Lucian of course
“describes” fantastic journeys to the moon, among other places, in Vera historia.S ee also Elsner
and Rubiés’s introduction to Voyages and Visions, 10–11, 15. Regarding philosophers/rhetors and 
exile and travel, see Whitmarsh, “‘Greece is the World,’” 269–305.
92John Elsner, “Pausanias: A Greek Pilgrim in the Roman World,” Past and Present 135 (1992)  t
3–29. See also James I. Porter, “Ideals and Ruins: Pausanias, Longinus, and the Second Sophistic,” 
in Pausanias: Travel and Memory in Roman Greece (ed. Susan Alcock et al.; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 63–92; and Ian Rutherford, “Tourism and the Sacred: Pausanias and the 
Traditions of Greek Pilgrimage,” in the same volume, p. 45.
93Geographical thinking infuses Tatian’s tour; in reading these passages we are reminded of
Pausanias, but even more of Claudius Ptolemy, the second-century C.E. geographer and astronomer
famous for his cool mathematical calculations of the cosmos, who also wrote the Tetrabiblos, a
book of what he calls “astronomical prognostication.” In this work, some of his references both
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sians thinkitis a goodidea. Barbarians avoid pederasty, but Romans herd children
together.93 Tatian constructs an authentic experience of travel and cultic tourism
that left him cold: he partook in mysteries, like so many of the elites of his time,
and he tested the cults (which he claims were organized by the effeminate and the
androgynes), and what he found was Zeus Latiaris and Artemis of Ephesus enjoy-
ing human gore and blood, and demons inspiring wrongdoing.94Tatian foundtruth
not in this tour of the marketplace of Greek cults, but in “barbarian writings.” He
was persuadedb y the “unaffected nature of the words” andb y the “artlessness of
the things which they said.” There he found clarity ofl anguage and of philosophi-
cal thought, andh e mocks the Greeks for lacking these characteristics.95 In this
section, Tatian twice uses the word plan to mark the Greek error in whichh e had
participated.96 Plan of course means “error” but also a “wandering” or “roaming
off.” Tatian’s very travels were the source of error; back in Syria (there’s no place
like home), he found simple and true philosophy.
In To the Greeks, Tatian also deploys one of the rhetorical techniques of the
second sophistic:ekphrasis,or narrative description. Pausanias and Lucian, among
others, describe statues andb uildings in detail, in part to demonstrate the scope
of their knowledge and the power of their rhetoric to recreate in words the skilled
lineaments of artwork.97 In The Dream,i n fact, Lucian states that his career choice
wasbetween sculpture andpaideia, an interesting self-presentation givenhisintri-
cateekphraseisof art elsewhere in his work.98 But Tatian’sekphrasisdoes not work 
the power of rhetoric to celebrate aesthetics: his list and his descriptions of statues
focus on sculptures of females and famous figures that exemplify not the art and
grace of Greece, but its shames: all the women described have engaged in some
questionable activity, according to Tatian, usually of a sexual sort; other figures
described are “memorials of evil.”99 “Our” women,i n contrast, Tatian asserts, are
chaste. Tatian follows and guarantees the truth of this ekphrasis by returning to
the theme ofhi s own travels, andb y focusing on the city of Rome, which collects
Greekness:
Tatian’s characterization of various nations. See, e.g., Tetrabiblos 4.10.
94Oratio ad Graecos 28–29.1.
95Oratio ad Graecos 29.1–2 (my translation). See also Dial. 8. And if we look more carefully,
we see that Justin moved to this singular and true philosophy not by reading the prophets, but by
their mere mention (Dial. 7). See also Tatian’s critique of grammarians and of misuses of language
in Oratio ad Graecos 26. On the topos of barbarians speaking simple truth, see Hartog, Memories
of Odysseus, 112.
96Oratio ad Graecos 29.1, 2.
97See Ja  Elsner, Art and the Roman Viewer: The Transformation of Art from the Pagan World to
Christianity(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 15–124. On Lucian’s anxieties about art
and ekphrasis, see Gregory W. Dobrov, “The Sophist on His Craft: Art, Text, and Self-Construction
in Lucian,” Helios 29 (2002) 173–92.
98See the interesting analysis of Whitmarsh, Greek Literature and the Roman Empire, 122–24.LAURA NASRALLAH 305
I set forth these things, not having learned them from another, but having
haunted much of the earth. I played the part of the sophist, using your goods. 
I met with much art and many ideas. Finally, having spent time in the city
of the Romans, I thoroughly learned about the varied statues which they
brought backf rom you as theirs. For I do not try, as is the custom of many, 
to strengthen with others’ opinions my own, but I wanted to compile a record
of all these things which I myselfdi rectly apprehended. . . . Therefore, say-
ingg oodbye  to  Roman  arrogance  and  Athenian  nonsense—incoherent
teachings—I  sought  after  what  you  say is  a  barbarian  philosophy.  Don’t 
scorn our paideia nor busy yourself with a quarreld i rected against us, full
of nonsense and coarse jesting, saying, “Tatian is instituting anew barbarian
doctrines, over and above the Greeks and the countless mass of those who
philosophize!”100
Tatian here places himself in the midst of the rhetorical conventions of the second
sophistic and,like others, critiquesits shallowness.101He asserts thathehas played
the part of the sophist. He affirms his personal experience through repeated travel
(ejpifoithvsaı). He also offers a particularly biting comment “to the Greeks”: he
learned Greek paideia and their patrimony by visiting Rome, where one can find
Greek statuary, now spoils of war.102 Tatian maps the Roman Empire as a site of
relative appropriations and valuations of kinds of knowledge. Rome has robbed 
Greece of its knowledge, but the barbarians’ edges of the world, with their simple 
and truthful knowledge, should be at the center of the empire.
Earlier, Tatian provided a laundryl i st of shockingh abits of Greeks, Romans, 
andothers. Thislist shouldnotbe readas pure venom against “pagan” religion,but
rather alongside the above passage as a mockery of the conventions ofcontemporary 
travel or ethnographic literature and as engagedi n discussion with other writers
who employ geographical thinking. Lucian did the same. Tatian, like Pausanias,
presents himself as a traveler in the culturally elite realms of the Roman Empire. 
He frames the equivalent of a “Grand Tour” of his time not in terms of a description
of piety, history, cult, or aesthetics, but in terms of cultic oddities and shame, insult 
and comparison. Tatian’s travels, whether in his imagination or in reality, have al-
lowedhim to see howlanguage, philosophy,geography, andpaideiaare conjoined.
“What is the benefit of Attic style and sorites of philosophers and plausabilities
of syllogisms and measurement of the earth and positions of stars and courses of
99See Oratio ad Graecos 33–34; the last quotation is from 34.1. 
100Oratio ad Graecos 35.1 (my translation).
101Tatian uses the familiar argument that Moses is older: “So it is clear from the preceding argu-
ments that Moses is older than heroes, cities, demons. We should believe one who has priorityi n
time in preference to Greeks who learnedh i s doctrines at secondh and. For with muchl abour their
sophists tried to counterfeit all they knew from Moses’ teaching andf rom those who philosophized
like him” (Oratio ad Graecos 40.1 [trans. Whittaker, 73]).
102And as we learn elsewhere in Oratio ad Graecos, in Rome one can also find philosophers
salaried by the Roman emperor “for no useful purpose but that they may even be paid for letting
their beards grow long” (19.1 [trans. Whittaker, 39]).306 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
the sun? For to be engagedi n suchi nvestigation is the work of one who frames
his own teachings as law.”103 For Tatian, language, philosophy, and terrestrial and
astronomical cartographies are linked, part of one system of paideia.
Throughout, Tatian’s focus is on the Greek paideia and identity that elite Ro-
mans adore and seek to appropriate, and which Greek elites configure and market
for their own and others’ consumption. Like other writers of the second sophistic,
Tatian meditates upon Greekness. And like his contemporary Lucian, he meditates
upon Greekness in part in order to mocki t, but he does so while using its tools and
topoiwithgreat sophistication. In Tatian’s geographical thinking, Rome isimportant
both as the guarantor of the authenticity of Tatian’s view and as a scavenger city,
location of the prizes of Greek culturali d entity. But Tatian inverts the traditional
importance of travel to Rome—with the prestige and higher speaking fees that this
trip often yielded to a rhetor or teacher104—and concludes his work by asserting
Assyrian identity and the joys of philosophizing among the barbarians. 
Justin Martyr
Justin, writing in the mid-second century, begins both the First and the Second
Apologies by marking Rome as the center ofhi s map, bothi n terms ofi ts political
and philosophical importance. The First Apology starts:
To the Emperor Titus Aelius Adrianus Antoninus Pius Augustus Caesar, and to
his son Verissimus the Philosopher, and to Lucius the Philosopher, the natural
son of Caesar, and the adopted son of Pius, a lover ofl earning, and to the sa-
cred Senate, with the whole People of the Romans, I, Justin, the son of Priscus
and grandson of Bacchius, from the city of Flavia Neapolis in Syria Palestine,
have made this address and petition on behalf of those of every race who are
unjustly hated and abusively threatened, myselfb eing one of them.105
Thus, unlike Lucian and Tatian, whose critiques of Rome are scathing, and whose
geographical thinking tends to center on their barbarian home, Justin’s Apologies
103Oratio ad Graecos 27.3 (my translation).
104Hartog, Memories of Odysseus, 193. See below, p. 308.
1051 Apol. 1.1 (my translation). See Thomas B. Falls, Writings of Saint Justin Martyr (Fathers of  r
the Church; New York: Christian Heritage, Inc., 1948) 33, n. 1: Palestina was used as an adjective
limiting the region ofSyria to its eastern parts. Unless otherwise noted, all translations ofJustin
will be from Falls. I use the Greek editions of Miroslav Marcovich, Iustini Martyris Apologiae Pro
Christianis (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1994). 
106In doing so, Justin participates in a long and continuing tradition of provincial/Greek elites
who address themselves to Rome, such as Polybius, Josephus, and Aelius Aristides. Rebecca Ly-
man has arguedi n the context ofh er larger discussion of the creation of “orthodoxy”: “Justin’s
intellectualh ybrid reflectedh i s own attempt as a Christian provincial and a philosopher to portray
universal truth within the cultural traditions of the second century” (“Hellenism and Heresy: 2002
NAPS Presidential Address,” 220; see also 221). Athenagoras Supp., esp. 1, 6, 37, presents a similar
appeal to the Roman imperial family’s piety and policies of toleration.
107The actual audience of Justin’s Second Apology, which was probably written between 150 and
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emphasize Rome’s centrality. He appeals to this center’s claims to tolerance and
addresses himself to Rome as one ofi ts provincial elites, speaking the common 
language of Greek, of privileged philosophy, and of Roman subject-hood.106
A thin wire of violence threads through the introductions to Justin’s First and t
Second Apologies.107 In both, Justin had marked Rome as the center of his mental 
map. But in the Second Apology, Rome is also the site where a Christian woman 
“doesviolence to herself”(biazomevnh eJauth;n)by remaining with her abusive non-
Christian husbandi n the hopes of persuading him to amend. Not only that, but she
isforcedinto court proceedings whenherhusbandaccusesher ofbeing a Christian.
Her appeals to the emperor for time to prepare a defense ultimately resultin the arrest 
(andimprisonment andpunishment) of three others (her teacher, andtwo Christian
bystanders), in a kind of domino effect of witness to Christianity. Lucius, one of
the arrested, addresses the prefect: “Your judgment is not fitting to the Emperor 
Pius, nor to the philosopher, Caesar’s son, nor to the sacred Senate!”108
With the story of this Christian woman, Justin offers an illustrative and sharp 
situationofapologiawithin his ownapologia. Moreover, he nicelydodges the need 
to critique the emperors directly by putting his assessment in another’s mouth; it
is Lucius who cries out that due process andi mperial piety and philosophy are not 
being servedb y the courts. Similarly, by using the phrase “she does violence to 
herself,” Justin points to Rome as a location of violence,but avoidsdirectly accusing 
the city of effecting violence. Yet in the First Apology, Justin directly states that 
“the rulers should give their decision in obedience, not to violence and tyranny, but 
to piety and philosophy.”109 Justin, unlike Tatian and Lucian, aligns himself with 
the center of imperial power: the Roman emperors and their philosophical piety.
He also attaches himself to the unimpeachable Socrates, a semeion or standard for 
Greeks, Christians, Romans, andb arbarians alike, whom he renders a kind of rea-
sonable forerunner to the Logos Jesus.110 Political power will honor the paideia of
its subjects, Justin asserts; the emperors are not really to blame, but must respond
to the needf or justice. When Justin critiques violent cult practices and those who
abuse Christians, he points the finger not at the imperial family but implies that 
Apology, and it makes brief reference to its audience as the Romans and the emperor. See Marcovich,
Iustini Martyris Apologiae Pro Christianis, 1–10; and Eric Osborn, Justin Martyr (Tübingen: Mohr/ r
Siebeck, 1973) 10–11; but see, also, Goodenough, Theology of Justin Martyr, 84–87.
108Justin, 2 Apol 2.16 (my translation).
1091 Apol. 3.2; oJmoivw~ d∆ au\ kai; tou;~ a[rconta~ mh; biva/ mhde; turannivdi, ajll∆ eujsebeiva/ kai; 
filosofiva/ ajkolouqou`nta~ th;n yh`fon tivqesqai. In the same passage, Justin alludes to Plato’s 
Republic in which all rulers in the ideal city are philosophers; see Marcovich, Iustini Marturis
Apologiae Pro Christianis, 35.
1101 Apol.5(trans. Falls, 38): “And not only among the Greeks were these things through Socrates 
condemned by reason [logos], but also among the non-Hellenic peoples by the Logos Himself, who
assumed a human form and became man, and was called Jesus Christ.” Justin also presents himself
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such violence andimpiety emerge from those who are oflower status—thelackeys
or misinterpreters of the pious, paideia-filled emperors.
Justin thus takes up Roman imperial propaganda about the emperor’s household
as philosophical, pious, and peaceful, and places Rome at the center of his plea
that the empire live up to its own claims. But elsewhere in the Second Apology,
it becomes clear that the very claim to philosophy can itself become a cause for 
violence in Rome, given the ongoing culture wars. “I too,” Justin writes, “expect
to be plotted against andfi xed to the stake, by some of those I have named, or per-
haps by Crescens, that philopsophos and philokompos,l over of noise andd i n.”111
Justin himselfh as made the “Roman voyage,” with all that implies. According to
Hartog, only by making this voyage “could renown and prestige be won: higher
fees could then be charged by a professor or a lecturer, and a greater social and
political role could be exercised, in particular as an (effective) intercessor on behalf 
of one’s native city.”112 Having traced the world from Neapolis in Syria through
(perhaps) Asia Minor and into Rome, Justin’s own experienced and cultured body
is able to offer up an authentic tour of knowledge, but nonetheless is vulnerable.
As Lucian presentedh i mself (or the client-philosopher) as subject to the vagaries
and corruptions oflif e in Rome, so too Justin, but in a more extreme way. Justin
himself maps Rome not only as a site ofd emons and exorcisms andi ntra-Chris-
tian conflict, but also as the dangerous site of philosophicalb attles andd i sputes
between the likes of himself and Crescens.113 Tatian, too, alludes to the dangers
of Crescens,114 and later readers versed in the tradition of Justin’s martyrdom in
Rome—his beheading—might turn back to Justin’s own writings to read him as
extremely vulnerable in Rome.115
The defiant Christian response that Justin offers in the Apologiesaddresses civil
injustice, yet implicitly praises the imperialf amily and the Senate, and confirms
Rome’s central place on the map: a location where violence is possible and likely,
but where redress andj ustice are sought. Ashis Nandy asks, “Has the dominant
idea of metropolitan civility, groundedi n the vision of the European Enlighten-
ment, itself been in league with that hidden record of violence?”116 The question
that Crescens knew nothing.
1112 Apol. 3.1 (my translation). Tatian, too, uses the term philopsophoi in contrast to those who
truly seek truth, as we have seen (Oratio ad Graecos 3.3). Moreover, he represents Rome as dimly
open to violence, with his mention of Crescens’s threats to Justin. The third-century account of 
Justin’s martyrdom places it in Rome. 
112Hartog, Memories of Odysseus, 193.
113On Crescens, see 2 Apol. 11.4 (also Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos 19.1 = Eusebius, Hist.
eccl. 4.16.8–9).
114Oratio ad Graecos 19.
115Recensions of the martyrdom of Justin andh i s companions can be foundi n Herbert Musurillo,
Acts of the Christian Martyrs (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972) 42–61. Lampe treats the Acta Iustini as if
they offer a fairly straightforward account of events and yield prosopographical evidence regarding
Christianity in Rome (From Paul to Valentinus, 276–79).
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can be fruitfully applied to antiquity as well. In the Apologies, which map Rome 
as center, Justinlegitimates Rome’s metropolitan status and claims to civility, only
barely exposing the “record of violence” found there.
The Dialogue with Trypho, in contrast, offers an understanding of the world 
thatdiffers fromtheApologies.This is due in part to the texts’ differences in genre:
the Apologies take the form of an appeal and a direct address, while the Dialogue
takes up the conventions of a philosophical dialogue. It is also due to the different 
implied audiences: the Apologiesat least claim for their audience non-Christians in 
Rome, while theDialoguehas no clearlyinscribedaudience.117TheDialogueasserts 
and constructs a Christian identity apart from Judaism—a Christian identity that
is universal rather than particular, attached to no place rather than to some place,
especially not the Jerusalem and surrounding regions of the Bar Kokhba revolt.118
The Dialogue’s mapping is far more complex than that of the Apologies, in part
because of the Dialogue’s complicated allegorical interpretation of the Hebrew 
Scriptures. Justin deftly moves between maps of actual and allegorical locations; 
geographies and ethnic markers become fluid expressions. For example, while in 
the Apologies the categories ofb arbarian and Christian were sometimes used as 
overlapping, the Dialogue’s one significant use of the term “barbarian” rejects
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2002) 219.
117Most hypothesize that the Dialogus is written for Christians or for proselytes who are wavering
between Christianity and Judaism. Regarding the debate on audience for Dialogus cum Tryphone
(Dial.), see Graham N. Stanton, “‘God-Fearers’: Neglected Evidence in Justin Martyr’s Dialogue
with Trypho,” in Early Christianity, Late Antiquity, and Beyond (ed. T. W. Hillard et al.; vol. 2 of d
Ancient History in a Modern University; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1998) 43–52; see also 
his “Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho: group boundaries, ‘proselytes’ and ‘God-fearers’,” in
Tolerance and Intolerance in Early Judaism and Christianity (ed. Graham N. Stanton and Guy G. 
Stroumsa; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 275–78; Rajak, “Talking at Trypho,”
75–80; Judith Lieu, Image and Reality: The Jews in the World of the Christians in the Second 
Century (London: T&T Clark, 1996) 104–9 (she calls it a “bridge” audience). Marcovich states, 
“It is for such a group of Gentiles leaning towards Judaism that thet reatise is primarily intended”
(Iustini Martyris Dialogus cum Tryphone, 64–65).
118On Justin’s rhetoric of Christian universality and Jewish particularity, see Denise Kimber
Buell, “Rethinking the Relevance of Race for Early Christian Self-Definition,” HTR 94 (2001) 465;
eadem, “Race and Universalism in Early Christianity,” esp. 462–68. See also ch. 3 of her Why This
New Race? Daniel Boyarin sees a debate over the Logos as the key to analyzing Dialogus cum 
Tryphone; see his Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity (Philadelphia, Pa.: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) ch. 2, esp. 37–41. 
119“But we Christians are not only a people, but a holy people, as we have already shown: ‘And 
they shall call it a holy people, redeemed by the Lord.’ Wherefore, we are not a contemptible people, 
nor a tribe ofb arbarians, nor just any nation as the Carians or the Phrygians, but the chosen people
of God” (Dial. 119.4 [trans. Falls, 331–32]). In contrast, in the Apologies the categories ofb arbarian
and Christian were sometimes used as overlapping (1 Apol. 5.4; 7.3; see esp. 46.3, where philosophi-
cal models are set in parallel: the “barbarian” Abraham, Ananias, and other figures from the Jewish
Scriptures are juxtaposed to the “Greeks” Socrates and Heraclitus). On the rhetorical deployment
of the categories of the particular and the universal in the construction of early Christian ethnicity, 
see Buell, Why This New Race? In contrast, see the implicit method of someone like Nock, who, 310 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
the characterization of Christians as barbarians, and thus as a people mappedi n
a particular region, rather than a people who transcend the bounds of ethnos and
region. Justin argues that Christians must be understood as God’s “holy people”
mentioned in prophecy.119 In the Apologies, as in Lucian’s and Tatian’s writings,
Rome is a center of violence—a violence produced both by the empire and by
(false) claims to philosophy at the empire’s center. In the Dialogue, Justin maps
Christians as a new Israel that is not geographically conceived, but rather understood
as infusing all places and nations.120 At the same time, Justin uses the Scriptures
of Israel to insist that it was foretold that the real Syria Palestine and especially its
metropolis of Jerusalem would burn, consumedb y God’s justified violence—not
Roman injustice.
Although elsewhere in his writings his identity as a Samaritan from Syria-
Palestine emerges,121 in the Dialogue, especially in contrast to the Jew Trypho,
Justin rises as the consummate universal Greek, a kind of philosophical everyman.
Trypho, his interlocutor—who, of course, speaks in Justin’s voice—greets Justin
as a philosopher because of Justin’s dress.122 Trypho’s Jewish identity is mapped
in a few brief strokes: “I am a Hebrew of the circumcision; having fled the ongo-
ing war, I am spending time in Greece, and mostly in Corinth.”123 These point to
Trypho’s location slightly off-center: a Jew from the war-ravaged province of
Palestine,124 philosophically located not quite at the center of Greek thought, but
slightly to the west, in Corinth, an ancient rival of Athens, which Rome razed and
in his Conversion, contrasts universal (prophetic) and particular religion.
120Buell, “Rethinking the Relevance of Race for Early Christian Self-Definition,” 465; eadem,
“Race and Universalism in Early Christianity,” 462–68.
121E.g., 1 Apol. 1.
122In addition to this costuming as a Greek philosopher, further elements point to its allusion
to themes of the second sophistic. Immediately in the dialogue, there is an allusion to Socratic
techniques of questioning, and a reference to Homer (J. C. M. Van Winden, An Early Christian
Philosopher: Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho Chapters One to Nine. Introduction, Text and
Commentary [Leiden: Brill, 1971] 22).
123Dial. 1.3.
124Regarding problems in Judea, see also Dial. 9. Judea as a reall ocation is mentioned only
sotto voce. As the group moves from one section of the colonnade to another to sit, Trypho turns
to a companion to mention the war in Judea; in his introduction ofhi mself, Trypho only alludes
to location, referring to having escaped the “ongoing war” (1.3). The violence of the Bar Kokhba
revolt is the background noise. See Shelly Matthews’s “The Need for the Stoning of Stephen,” in
Violence in the New Testament: Jesus Followers and Other Jews Under Empire (ed. eadem and
E. Leigh Gibson; New York: T&T Clark International, 2005) 124–39, which discusses a situation
analogous to Justin’s construction of Trypho: Luke-Acts’ construction of Jews as other and barbarous
in the story of the stoning of Stephen.
125On Justin’s “conversion,” see Nasrallah, “The Rhetoric of Conversion and the Construction
of Experience.” Attempts to find a concrete historical and geographical setting for this event of
“conversion” (e.g., Oskar Skarsaune, The Proof from Prophecy: A Study in Justin Martyr’s Proof-
Text Tradition: Text-Type, Provenance, Theological Profile [Leiden: Brill, 1987] 245–46) miss the
conventionality of the image of the philosophical seeker. Note Rajak’s astute observation that “the
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reestablished as a colony. Justin in contrast is not introduced with simple identity
markers paralleling those of Trypho—for example, “a Christian, son of Priscus,
lately in Samaria.” Instead, he offers a long conversion story, which expands upon 
Trypho’s first impression of him (or Vitruvius’s ideal victim of shipwreck) as 
cloaked in such a way that markers of ethnic origin or ritual affiliation fall away,
with only the identity of philosopher remaining.125
The Dialogue asserts Justin’s universal appeal, but in the present, ties Jews 
intimately to Jerusalem andi ts environs. Jerusalem is not just another city, but it
is the quintessential city over time, “God’s holy mountain” of Zion, where Jesus 
Christ will appear again and will reign for a thousand years.126 Justin also depicts
Jerusalem as the city from which persecution of Christians has recently emerged:
“[Y]ou even dispatched certain picked men from Jerusalem to every land, to re-
port the outbreak of the godless heresy of the Christians,” he accuses.127 Thus, he 
implies, it is also now a site of violent destruction. Justin adopts Scriptures about 
the Babylonian destruction of Jerusalem in order to talk about its destruction by
the Romans—except that he attributes this destruction to God, not to the forces 
ofh uman empire. I quote the famous passage about circumcision marking Jews 
for abuse:
Indeed the custom of circumcising the flesh, handedd own from Abraham,
was given to you as a distinguishing mark, to set you off from other nations
andf rom us Christians. The purpose of this was that you and only you might
suffer the afflictions that are now justlyy ours; that onlyy our land be desolate, 
and your cities ruined by fire; that the fruits of your land be eaten by strang-
ers before your very eyes; that not one of you be permitted to enter your city
of Jerusalem.128
The Roman Empire’s involvement in this violence is not recognized; the word
“Rome” does not even appear in the Dialogue.
The Dialogue maps a world where violence is located on the edge, in a region
that was once center: the ruined Jerusalem and weakened Syria-Palestine.129 Its
The Jew is attractedb y Justin’s garb, and thus Trypho is temporarily constructed as ‘one of us’ ” 
(“Talking at Trypho,” 64). See also Horner, Listening to Trypho, 73–83, on Justin’s self-crafting in
relation to the second sophistic.
126Dial. 80–81, 85.
127Dial. 17 (trans. Falls, 173).
128Dial. 16 (trans. Falls, 172). Part of this passage is a quotation from Isa 1:7. See also 25–26,
40, 108. Some scholars, however, surprisingly do not recognize the undertones of violence here: 
Graham Stanton, for example, mentions the “moderate tone of the Dialogue as a whole” (“Other 
Early Christian Writings: ‘Didache’, Ignatius, ‘Barnabas’, Justin Martyr,” inEarly Christian Thought
in its Jewish Context [ed. John Barclay and John Sweet; New York: Cambridge University Press, t
1996] 188). Demetrios Trakatellis argues that “Trypho was the noble vision of a refined Christian 
thinker” (“Justin Martyr’s Trypho,” HTR 79 [1986] 297). See however, Rajak, “Talking at Trypho,” 
60, who rightly understands that the Dialogue does not represent a pleasant exchange.
129Justin does allude to the future centrality of Jerusalem; see discussion above.
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own central setting is a kind of nether land of generic Greekness. Eusebius his-
toricizes the dialogue, placing it in Ephesus, but I think that Justin is deliberately
vague and generic in his location of his interaction with Trypho. He offers a kind
of stage set for actingout philosophy: a covered colonnade,130and later, some stone
benches.131Throughout his corpus, Justin alludes to Plato and to Stoic thought and
appeals to the story of Socrates’ life and death in order to muse on the persecution
of Christians and on his own role as a philosopher. In the Dialogue, such references
become part of Justin’s own costuming in philosophical garb. Just as the location
of the Dialogue is a kind of generic philosophical stage set, so also the costuming
for the production. While Justin’s Apologiesconstructeda map centered on Rome,
the Dialogue asserts no place in particular. Jerusalem burns on its margins, but a
philosopher like Justin cannot be tied down to one place.
 Conclusions
This paper has used a framework of geographical thinking to place Justin’s and
Tatian’s references to travel and cities within the broader cultural context of the
131Dial. 9.3.
132Although, note that Martin Elze, while still holding to the category of apologetic, recog-
nizes that Tatian’s Oratio ad Graecos is not an apology (Tatian und seine Theologie [Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960] 41). Johannes Quasten’s Patrology ([3 vols.; Utrecht: Spectrum,
1964–1966] 1.186), however, categorizes Justin and Tatian as apologists, and further explains 
that “with the Greek Apologists the literature of the Church addresses itself for the first time to 
the outside world and enters the domain of culture and science.” We know, however, that even 
if Justin inscribes his audience as the Roman emperors and the people of Rome, and even if
Tatian inscribes his audience as Greeks, these writings were probably directed to and popular
with Christian communities, andi nscribe or construct an audience of outsiders in their claim to 
defend Christianity. See Loveday Alexander, “The Acts of the Apostles as an Apologetic Text,” 
in Apologetics in the Roman Empire (ed. Edwards et al.) 21–22. My own thinking about defining
apologetic was sparked in part byAnnewies van den Hoek’s “Apologetic and Protreptic Discourse 
in Clement of Alexandria,” and discussion of this paper at the Boston Patristic Society in Sep-
tember 2004; see also Lyman’s “The Politics of Passing,” 43–44. For excellent considerations of 
the genre of apologetic, see J.-C. Fredouille, “L’apologétique chrétienne antique. Naissance d’un 
genre littéraire,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 38 (1992) 219–34 andi d em, “L’apologétique
chrétienne antique. Metamorphoses d’un genre polymorphe,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes
41 (1995) 201–16. Alain Le Boulluec, in De Justin à Irénée (vol. 1 of La notion d’hérésie dans
la littérature grecque, IIe I I –IIIe I I siècles; Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1985), argues that Justin’s 
apologetic, in fact, invented the category of heresy. On Christian paideia and relations withG reek
culture, see the seminal work of Werner Jaeger, such as his Early Christianity and Greek Paideia
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1961).
133Quasten asserted that “we may speak therefore of a Christianization of Hellenism but hardly
of a Hellenization of Christianity” (Patrology, 1.188).
134In the recent volume Apologetics in the Roman Empire, apologetic is largely understood as
a Christian phenomenon; only two ofi ts ten chapters deal with non-Christian sources. Frances 
Young’s learned and useful survey chapter on “GreekApologists of the Second Century,” discusses
only Christian authors, and states that writings like those of Justin and Tatian justify their authors’ 
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secondsophistic, rather than marginalizing them as Christian apologists.132Scholars 
have generally understood apologetic as a Christian (or perhaps Jewish and Chris-
tian) phenomenon that offers some resistance either to Hellenism or to the Roman 
Empire or to both.133 Apologetic is thus a modern category that helps scholars to 
frame their understandings of the ancient world, rather than a commonlyunderstood 
genre of antiquity.134 While it is clear that Christians and others defended them-
selves against accusations in antiquity—offered up apologiai—ancient rhetorical 
handbooks do not discuss apologetic as a genre.135 Plato’s Apology certainly cast a 
long andinfluential shadow over the Greco-Roman world,136but while early Chris-
tians frequently invoked Socrates as a way off i guring their own oppression and
response, they did so in a variety of ways that cannot easily be clustered under the
one category. Even an early Christian writer like Eusebius, listing various figures 
who would come to be called apologists, does so not in the context of discussing
apologetic, but in a chronological account of various writers who emerged under 
various emperors.137 Rather than being a generic term from antiquity or an organic
literary phenomenon arising from Christian persecution, the category of apolo-
getic may emerge from the taxonomic impulses of seventeenth-century European 
scholars, struggling in the context of the rise of Protestantism and the clash of
thus abandoning the comfortable ethos of the Graeco-Roman synthesis into which they had been 
born, nurtured, and educated” (81). But, as we have seen, Justin and Tatian hardly reject “classical
literature” or the “Graeco-Roman synthesis.” Some scholarship on apologetic does imply that the
boundaries between (Christian) apologists and others are porous. See Robert Grant, Greek Apolo-
gists of the Second Century (Philadelphia, Pa.: Westminster, 1988) esp. 9.
135Alexander, “The Acts of the Apostles,” 24. Van den Hoek (“Apologetic and Protreptic Dis-
course in Clement of Alexandria”) questions traditionald efinitions of apologetic and protreptic. If
we try to explore what apologetic might be by searching for apologia and its cognates in what is 
usually termed early Christian apologetic, we find very little. Tatian’s Oratio ad Graecos contains
no such terms, and Justin uses apologia or its cognates only once in the Dialogus cum Tryphone,
and only four times within his writings altogether. 
136See Alexander, “The Acts of the Apostles,” 20–21. Justin’s first apology echoes aspects of
Socrates in Plato’s Apology; see especially the notes in volume 1.1 of Johannes Otto’s Corpus
apologetarum Christianorum saeculi secundi (Wiesbaden: Sändig, 1851–1969).
137Van den Hoek reaches this conclusion in her “Apologetic and Protreptic Discourse in Clement
of Alexandria.” See especially Hist. eccl. 4.3.
138For first uses of apologetic in seventeenth-century English literature, s.v. “apologetic,” “apol-
ogy,” Oxford English Dictionary. The concern about Hellenism and Christianity has long fuelled
the question that scholars bring to the study of Justin—a question that often reveals scholars’ 
anxieties about the relationship between Platonic philosophy and Christian theology in their own 
times. See Niels Hyldahl, Philosophie und Christentum. Eine Interpretation der Einleitung zum 
Dialog Justins (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1966); and Oskar Skarsaune, “The Conversion of Justin 
Martyr,” Studia Theologica 30 (1976) 56–59. These two argue that Justin understands there to be a 
rift between Platonism and Christianity. See Van Winden, An Early Christian Philosopher, 24,f or
a review of the history of scholarship on Justin’s philosopher’s cloak, and what it might indicate
about the continuity or discontinuity ofhis relationship with philosophy. For a sophisticated reading
of the categories of Christianity and Hellenism as they relate to Justin, see Lyman, “The Politics 314 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
religion and science, as well as from Christian concerns about the self-definition
of Christianity, especially in relation to Platonist philosophy.138
In this article, I am engaged in my own shifting of the traditional scholarly
map: Justin and Tatian should not be sequestered into Christian apologetic—itself
a questionable category, but instead should be read as engaged in the broader 
cultural conversations, in which Lucian represents one satirical and strong voice.
These writings take part in a struggle within (and against) the Roman Empire,
whose conquests occurred not only through military means, but also through an
uneven policy of tolerance that rewarded and at times demanded assimilation. We
have also seen that Justin, Tatian, and Lucian teach us about one use of the sign
“barbarian” under this Roman Empire: the person who has mastered Greekness
and yet is ambivalent about that mastery.
This article has shown how Justin, Tatian, and Lucian are Vitruvian men in two
senses. They remind us of Vitruvius’s shipwrecked traveler, at home everywhere
in the world with only paideia in hand. They rhetorically construct themselves as
wandering truth-seekers from the empire’s eastern ranges, struggling with their 
quests for truthi n their common cultural context, and questioning the value of
Greekpaideiaeven as theyhave masteredit. Yet they are also Vitruvian men in that
theirbodies, whichcontain the perfect symmetry of their mastery ofGreekpaideia,
become the measure by which they map the world. Because of their proximity to
or embracing of barbarian identity, they are vulnerable in the Roman world. In the
city of Rome, Justin and Lucian especially are vulnerable to real violence and to
violence done to certain kinds of knowledge, and Tatian depicts Greeks as vulner-
able to the city of Rome’s appropriation of their cultural patrimony.
In addition to using the framework of geography to bring together the mental
mappings of Justin, Tatian, and Lucian, three easterners with complex relation-
ships to Greek paideia, this article has sought to complicate the model of center 
and periphery that is often used to talk about the Roman Empire, instead pointing
to the ambiguous and complicated ways in which citieslike Rome, Athens, and the
barbarian homeland are mapped. It has used this model of mapping and geography
in order to investigate how Justin, Tatian, and Lucian, two Christians and one sati-
rist of everything, including Christianity, conceive of cities, geography, and travel
under the Roman Empire. Key to their rhetorical constructions of these cities—Je-
rusalem, Rome, Athens, Hierapolis—is the issue of the dangers of travel, both to
body and mind. These writers do not so muchf ear topomachia in the blank spaces
of the map, but rather offer a kind of cartography of epistemic violence across the
empire as they question whose sources ofknowledge are trammeledand whose are
falsely elevated. In the works of Justin, Tatian, and Lucian, the second sophistic’s
usual elevation of Greek paideiais challenged. Rome is portrayed as complicit in a
sometimes violent consumption of purchasedpaideiaand of enslaved goods—both
statuary bodies and real live philosophers’ bodies. According to all three writers,
out of Syria, coded as barbarian, may come a purer, simpler knowledge.LAURA NASRALLAH 315